Histories 18

Polybius Histories 18.16
King Attalus had received exceptional honours on a former occasion also from the Sicyonians after he had ransomed for them at considerable expense the land consecrated to Apollo, in return for which they set up a colossal statue of him •ten cubits high, next that of Apollo in their market-place. And now again, upon his giving them ten talents and ten thousand medimni of wheat, his popularity increased fourfold, and they voted his portrait in gold and passed a law enjoining the performance of an annual sacrifice to him. Attalus, then, having received these honours left for Cenchreae.
Cruelty of the Wife of Nabis at Argos

Polybius Histories 18.17
Nabis the tyrant, leaving Timocrates of Pellen in command of Argos, as he placed the greatest reliance on him and employed him in the most ambitious of his enterprises, returned to Sparta and after some days sent off his own wife, ordering her upon reaching Argos to set about raising money. Upon her arrival she greatly surpassed Nabis in cruelty. For summoning the women, some of them singly and others with their families, she subjected them to every kind of outrage and violence until she had stripped them nearly all not only of their gold ornaments, but of their most precious clothing....
Attalus, discoursing at some length, reminded them of the valour their ancestors had always displayed.

Campaign of Flamininus in Thessaly and Battle of Cynoscephalaea

Polybius Histories 18.18
Flamininus, not being able to discover where the enemy were encamped, but knowing for a certainty that they were in Thessaly, ordered all his soldiers to cut stakes for a palisade to carry with them for use when required. This appears to be impossible when the Greek usage is followed, but on the Roman system it is easy to cut them. For the Greeks have difficulty in holding only their pikes when on the march and in supporting the fatigue caused by their weight, but the Romans, hanging their long shields from their shoulders by leather straps and only holding their javelins in their hands, can manage to carry the stakes besides. Also the stakes are quite different. For the Greeks consider that stake the best which has the most and the stoutest offshoots all round the main stem, while the stakes of the Romans have but two or three, or at the most four strange lateral prongs, and these all on one side and not alternating. The result of this is that they are quite easy to carry for one man can carry three or four, making a bundle of them, and when put to use they are much more secure. For the Greek stakes, when planted round the camp, are in the first place easily pulled up; since when the portion of a stake that holds fast closely pressed by the earth is only one, and the offshoots from it are many and large, and when two or three men catch hold of the same stake by its lateral branches, it is easily pulled up Upon this an entrance is at once created owing to its size, and the ones next to it are loosened, because in such a palisade the stakes are intertwined and criss-crossed in few places. With the Romans it is the reverse; for in planting them they so intertwine them that it is not easy to see to which of the branches, the lower ends of which are driven into the ground, the lateral prongs belong, nor to which prongs the branches belong. So, as these prongs are close together and adhere to each other, and as their points are carefully sharpened, it is not easy to pass one's hand through and grasp the stake, nor if one does get hold of it, is it easy to pull it up, as in the first place the power of resistance derived from the earth by all the portions open to attack is almost absolute, and next because a man who pulls at one prong is obliged to lift up numerous other stakes which give simultaneously under the strain owing to the way they are intertwined, and it is not at all probable that two or three men will get hold of the same stake. But if by main force a man succeeds in pulling up one or two, the gap is scarcely observable. Therefore, as the advantages of this kind of palisade are very great, the stakes being easy to find and easy to carry and the whole being more secure and more durable when constructed, it is evident that if any Roman military contrivance is worthy of our imitation and adoption this one certainly is, in my own humble opinion at least.

Polybius Histories 18.19
To resume — Flamininus, having prepared these stakes to be used when required, advanced slowly with his whole force and established his camp at a distance of about fifty stades from Pherae. Next day at daybreak he sent out scouts to see if by observation and inquiry they could find any means of discovering where the enemy were and what they were about. Philipus, at nearly the same time, on hearing that the Romans were encamped near Thebes, left Larisa with his entire army and advanced marching in the direction of Pherae. When at a distance of thirty stades from that town he encamped there while it was still early and ordered all his men to occupy themselves with the care of their persons. Next day at early dawn he aroused his men, and sending on in advance those accustomed to precede the main body with orders to cross the ridge above Pherae, he himself, when day began to break, moved the rest of his forces out of the camp. The advanced sections of both armies very nearly came into contact at the pass over the hills; for when in the early dusk they caught sight of each other, they halted when already quite close and sent at once to inform their respective commanders of the fact and inquire what they should do. It was decided to remain for that day in their actual camp and to recall the advanced forces. Next day both commanders sent out some horse and light-armed infantry about three hundred of either arm to reconnoitre. Among these Flamininus included two squadrons of Aetolians owing to their acquaintance with the country. The respective forces met on the near side of Pherae, in the direction of Larisa, and a desperate struggle ensued. As the force under Eupolemus the Aetolian fought with great vigour and called up the Italians to take part in the action, the Macedonians found themselves hard pressed. For the present, after prolonged skirmishing, both forces separated and retired to their camps.

Polybius Histories 18.20
Next day both armies, dissatisfied with the ground near Pherae, as it was all under cultivation and covered with walls and small gardens, retired from it. Philipus for his part began to march towards Scotussa, hoping to procure supplies from that town and afterwards when fully furnished to find ground suitable for his own army. But Flamininus, suspecting his purpose, put his army in motion at the same time as Philipus with the object of destroying the corn in the territory of Scotussa before his adversary could get there. As there were high hills between the two armies in their march neither did the Romans perceive where the Macedonians were marching to nor the Macedonians the Romans. After marching all that day, Flamininus having reached the place called Eretria in Phthiotis and Philipus the river Onchestus, they both encamped at those spots, each ignorant of the position of the other's camp. Next day they again advanced and encamped, Philipus at the place called Melambium in the territory of Scotussa and Flamininus at the sanctuary of Thetis in that of Pharsalus, being still in ignorance of each others' whereabouts. In the night there was a violent thunderstorm accompanied by rain, and next morning at early dawn all the mist from the clouds descended on the earth, so that owing to the darkness that prevailed one could not see even people who were close at hand. Philipus, however, who was in a hurry to effect his purpose, broke up his camp and advanced with his whole army, but finding it difficult to march owing to the mist, after having made but little progress, he intrenched his army and sent off his covering force with orders to occupy the summits of the hills which lay between him and the enemy.

Polybius Histories 18.21
Flamininus lay still encamped near the sanctuary of Thetis and, being in doubt as to where the enemy were, he pushed forward ten squadrons of horse and about a thousand light-armed infantry, sending them out with orders to go over the ground reconnoitering cautiously. In proceeding towards the pass over the hills they encountered the Macedonian covering force quite unexpectedly owing to the obscurity of the army. Both forces were thrown somewhat into disorder for a short time but soon began to take the offensive, sending to their respective commanders messengers to inform them of what had happened. When in the combat that ensued the Romans began to be overpowered and to suffer loss at the hands of the Macedonian covering force they sent to their camp begging for help, and Flamininus, calling upon Archedamus and Eupolemus the Aetolians and two of his military tribunes, sent them off with five hundred horse and two thousand foot. For the Romans, encouraged by the arrival of the reinforcements, fought with redoubled vigour, and the Macedonians, though defending themselves gallantly, were in their turn pressed hard, and upon being completely overmastered, fled to the summits and sent to the king for help.

Polybius Histories 18.22
Philipus, who had never expected, for the reasons Ihave stated, that a general engagement would take place on that day, had even sent out a fair number of men from his camp to forage, and now when he heard of the turn affairs were taking from the messengers, and as the mist was beginning to clear, he called upon Heraclides of Gyrton, the commander of the Thessalian horse, and Leo, who was in command of the Macedonian horse, and dispatched them, together with all the mercenaries except those from Thrace, under the command of Athenagoras. Upon their joining the covering force the Macedonians, having received such a large reinforcement, pressed hard on the enemy and in their turn began to drive the Romans from their heights. But the chief obstacle to their putting the enemy entirely to rout was the high spirit of the Aetolian cavalry who fought with desperate gallantry. For as much as the Aetolian infantry is inferior in the equipment and discipline required for a general engagement, by so much is their cavalry superior to that of other Greeks in detached and single combats. Thus on the present occasion they so far checked the spirit of the enemy's advance that the Romans were not as before driven down to the level ground, but when they were at a short distance from it turned and steadied themselves. Flamininus, upon seeing that not only had his light infantry and cavalry given way, but that his whole army was flustered owing to this, led out all his forces and drew them up in order of battle close to the hills. At the same time one messenger after another from the covering force came running to Philipus shouting, "Sire, the enemy are flying: do not lose the opportunity: the barbarians cannot stand before us: the day is yours now: this is your time"; so that Philipus, though he was not satisfied with the ground, still allowed himself to be provoked to do battle. The above-mentioned hills are, Ishould say, called "The Dog's Heads" (Cynoscephalae): they are very rough and broken and attain a considerable height. Philipus, therefore, foreseeing what difficulties the ground would present, was at first by no means disposed to fight, but now urged on by these excessively sanguine reports he ordered his army to be led out of the entrenched camp.

Polybius Histories 18.23
Flamininus, having drawn up his whole army in line, both took steps to cover the retreat of his advanced force and walking along the ranks addressed his men. His address was brief, but vivid and easily understood by his hearers. For pointing to the enemy, who were now in full view, he said to his men, "Are these not the Macedonians whom, when they held the pass leading to Eordaea, you under Sulpicius attacked in the open and forced to retreat to the higher ground after slaying many of them? Are these not the same Macedonians who when they held that desperately difficult position in Epirus you compelled by your valour to throw away their shields and take to flight, never stopping until they got home to Macedonia? What reason, then, have you to be timid now when you are about to do battle with the same men on equal terms? What need for you to dread a recurrence of former danger, when you should rather on the contrary derive confidence from memory of the past! And so, my men, encouraging each other dash onto the fray and put forth all your strength. For if it be the will of Heaven, Ifeel sure that this battle will end like the former ones." After speaking thus he ordered those on the right to remain where they were with the elephants in front of them, and taking with him the left half of the army, advanced to meet the enemy in imposing style. The advanced force of the Romans thus supported by the infantry of the legions now turned and fell upon their foes.

Polybius Histories 18.24
Philipus at this time, now that he saw the greater part of his army drawn up outside the entrenchment, advanced with the peltasts and the right wing of phalanx, ascending energetically the slope that led to the hills and giving orders to Nicanor, who was nicknamed the elephant, to see that the rest of his army followed him at once. When the leading ranks reached the top of the pass, he wheeled to the left, and occupied the summits above it; for, as the Macedonian advanced force had pressed the Romans for a considerable distance down the opposite side of the hills, he found these summits abandoned. While he was still deploying his force on the right his mercenaries appeared hotly pursued by the Romans. For when the heavy-armed Roman infantry had joined the light infantry, as Isaid, and gave them their support in the battle, they availed themselves of the additional weight thus thrown into the scale, and pressing heavily on the enemy killed many of them. When the king, just after his arrival, saw that the light infantry were engaged not far from the hostile camp he was overjoyed, but now on seeing his own men giving way in their turn and in urgent need of support, he was compelled to go to their assistance and thus decide the whole fate of the army on the spur of the moment, although the greater portion of the phalanx was still on the march and approaching the hills. Receiving those who were engaged with the enemy, he placed them all, both foot and horse, on his right wing and ordered the peltasts and that part of the phalanx he had with him to double their depth and close up towards the right. Upon this being done, the enemy being now close upon them, orders were sent out to the men of the phalanx to lower their spears and charge, while the light infantry were ordered to place themselves on the flank. At the same moment Flamininus, having received his advanced force into the gaps between the maniples, fell upon the enemy.

Polybius Histories 18.25
As the encounter of the two armies was accompanied by deafening shouts and cries, both of them uttering their war-cry and those outside the battle also cheering the combatants, the spectacle was such as to inspire terror and acute anxiety. Philipus's right wing acquitted themselves splendidly in the battle, as they were charging from higher ground and were superior in the weight of their formation, the nature of their arms also giving them a decided advantage on the present occasion. But as for the rest of his army, those next to the force actually engaged were still at a distance from the enemy and those on the left had only just surmounted the ridge and come into view of the summits. Flamininus, seeing that his men could not sustain the charge of the phalanx, but that since his left was being forced back, some of them having already perished and others retreating slowly, his only hope of safety lay in his right, hastened to place himself in command there, and observing that those of the enemy who were next the actual combatants were idle, and that some of the rest were still descending to meet him from the summits and others had halted on the heights, placed his elephants in front and led on his legions to the attack. The Macedonians now, having no one to give them orders and being unable to adopt the formation proper to the phalanx, in part owing to the difficulty of the ground and in part because they were trying to reach the combatants and were still in marching order and not in line, did not even wait until they were at close quarters with the Romans, but gave way thrown into confusion and broken up by the elephants alone.

Polybius Histories 18.26
Most of the Romans followed up these fugitives and continued to put them to the sword: but one of the tribunes with them, taking not more than twenty maniples and judging on the spur of the moment what ought to be done, contributed much to the total victory. For noticing that the Macedonians under Philipus had advanced a long way in front of the rest, and were by their weight forcing back the Roman left, he quitted those on the right, who were now clearly victorious, and wheeling his force in the direction of the scene of combat and thus getting behind the Macedonians, he fell upon them in the rear. As it is impossible for the phalanx to turn right about face or to fight man to man, he now pressed his attack home, killing those he found in his way, who were incapable of protecting themselves, until the whole Macedonian force were compelled to throw away their shields and take to flight, attacked now also by the troops who had yielded before their frontal charge and who now turned and faced them. Philipus at first, as Isaid, judging from the success of those under his own leadership, was convinced that his victory was complete, but now on suddenly seeing that the Macedonians were throwing away their shields and that the enemy had attacked them in the rear, retired with a small number of horse and foot to a short distance from the scene of action and remained to observe the whole scene. When he noticed that the Romans in pursuit of his left wing had already reached the summits, he decided to fly, collecting hastily as many Thracians and Macedonians as he could. Flamininus, pursuing the fugitives and finding when he reached the crest of the ridge that the ranks of the Macedonian left were just attaining the summits, at first halted. The enemy were now holding up their spears, as is the Macedonian custom when they either surrender or go over to the enemy, and on learning the significance of this he kept back his men, thinking to spare the beaten force. But while he was still making up his mind some of the Romans who had advanced further fell on them from above and began to cut them down. Most of them perished, a very few escaping after throwing away their shields.

Polybius Histories 18.27
The battle being now over and the Romans everywhere victorious, Philipus retreated towards Tempe. He spent the following night under canvas at a place called "Alexander's Tower" and next day went on to Gonni at the entrance of Tempe, and remained there wishing to pick up the survivors of the rout. The Romans, after following up the fugitives for a certain distance, began, some of them, to strip the dead and others to collect prisoners, but most of them ran to plunder the enemy's camp. Finding, however, that the Aetolians had anticipated them there and considering themselves defrauded of the booty that was rightfully theirs, they began to find fault with the Aetolians and told their general that he imposed the risk on them and gave up the booty to others. For the present they returned to their own camp and retired to rest, and spent the next day in collecting prisoners and what was left of the spoil and also in advancing in the direction of Larisa. Of the Romans about seven hundred fell and the total Macedonian loss amounted to about eight thousand killed and not fewer than five thousand captured. Such was the result of the battle at Cynoscephalae between the Romans and Philipus.

Advantages and Disadvantages of the Phalanx

Polybius Histories 18.28
In my sixth Book I promised that when a suitable occasion presented itself I would institute a comparison between the Roman and Macedonian equipment and formation, showing how they differ for the better or worse, and I will, now that we see them both in actual practice, endeavour to fulfil this promise. For since the Macedonian formation in former times was proved by the experience of facts to be superior to other formations in use in Asia and Greece and that of the Romans likewise showed itself superior to those in use in Africa and among all the peoples of western Europe, and since now in our own times not once, but frequently, these two formations and the soldiers of both nations have been matched against each other, it will prove useful and beneficial to inquire into the difference, and into the reason why on the battle-field the Romans have always had the upper hand and carried off the palm, so that we may not, like foolish men, talk simply of chance and felicitate the victors without giving any reason for it, but may, knowing the true causes of their success, give them a reasoned tribute of praise and admiration. It will not be necessary to dilate upon the battles of the Romans with Hannibal and their defeats therein; for there they met with defeat not owing to their equipment and formation but owing to Hannibal's skill and cleverness. This I made sufficiently clear in dealing with battles in question, and the best testimony to the justice of what I said was, first of all, the actual end of the war. For very soon when the Romans had the advantage of the services of a general of like capacity with Hannibal then victory was an immediate consequence of this. And secondly, Hannibal himself, discarding his original armament at once on winning the first battle, armed his own forces with the Roman weapons and continued to employ these up to the end. As for Pyrrhus he employed not only Italian arms but Italian forces, placing cohorts of these and cohorts composed of men from the phalanx in alternate order in his battles with the Romans. But still even by this means he could not gain a victory, but the result of all their battles was always more or less doubtful.
It was necessary for me to preface my comparison by these few words in order that my statements may meet with no contradiction. Iwill now proceed to the comparison itself.

Polybius Histories 18.29
That when the phalanx has its characteristic virtue and strength nothing can sustain its frontal attack or withstand the charge can easily be understood for many reasons. For since, when it has closed up for action, each man, with his arms, occupies a space of three pes in breadth, and the length of the pikes is according to the original design sixteen cubits, but as adapted to actual need fourteen cubits , from which we must subtract the distance between the bearer's two hands and the length of the weighted portion of the pike behind which serves to keep it couched — four cubits in all — it is evident that it must extend ten cubits beyond the body of each hoplite when he charges the enemy grasping it with both hands. The consequence is that while the pikes of the second, third, and fourth ranks extend farther than those of the fifth rank, those of that rank extend two cubits beyond the bodies of the men in the first rank, when the phalanx has its characteristic close order as regards both depth and breadth, as Homer expresses it in these verses:

Spear crowded spear, Shield, helmet, man press'd helmet, man, and shield; The hairy crests of their resplendent casques Kiss'd close at every nod, so wedged they stood.

This description is both true and fine, and it is evident that each man of the first rank must have the points of five pikes extending beyond him, each at a distance of two cubits from the next.

Polybius Histories 18.30
From this we can easily conceive what is the nature and force of a charge by the whole phalanx when it is sixteen deep. In this case those further back and the fifth rank cannot use their pikes so as to take any active part in the battle. They therefore do not severally level their pikes, but hold them slanting up in the air over the shoulders of those in front of them, so as to protect the whole formation from above, keeping off by this serried mass of pikes all missiles which, passing over the heads of the first ranks, might fall on those immediately in front of and behind them. But these men by the sheer pressure of their bodily weight in the charge add to its force, and it is quite impossible for the first ranks to face about. Such being in general and in detail the disposition of the phalanx, Ihave now, for purposes of comparison, to speak of the peculiarities of the Roman equipment and system of formation and the points of difference in both. Now in the case of the Romans also each soldier with his arms occupies a space of three pes in breadth, but as in their mode of fighting each man must move separately, as he has to cover his person with his long shield, turning to meet each expected blow, and as he uses his sword both for cutting and thrusting it is obvious that a looser order is required, and each man must be at a distance of at least three pes from the man next him in the same rank and those in front of and behind him, if they are to be of proper use. The consequence will be that one Roman must stand opposite two men in the first rank of the phalanx, so that he has to face and encounter ten pikes, and it is both impossible for a single man to cut through them all in time once they are at close quarters and by no means easy to force their points away, as the rear ranks can be of no help to the front rank either in thus forcing the pikes away or in the use of the sword. So it is easy to see that, as Isaid at the beginning, nothing can withstand the charge of the phalanx as long as it preserves its characteristic formation and force.

Polybius Histories 18.31
What then is the reason of the Roman success, and what is it that defeats the purpose of those who use the phalanx? It is because in war the time and place of action is uncertain and the phalanx has only one time and one place in which it can perform its peculiar service. Now, if the enemy were obliged to adapt themselves to the times and places required by the phalanx when a decisive battle was impending, those who use the phalanx would in all probability, for the reasons Istated above, always get the better of their enemies; but if it is not only possible but easy to avoid its onset why should one any longer dread an attack of a body so constituted? Again, it is acknowledged that the phalanx requires level and clear ground with no obstacles such as ditches, clefts, clumps of trees, ridges and water courses, all of which are sufficient to impede and break up such a formation. Every one would also acknowledge that it is almost impossible except in very rare cases to find spaces of say twenty stades or even more in length with no such obstacles. But even if we assume it to be possible, supposing those who are fighting against us refuse to meet us on such ground, but force round sacking the cities and devastating the territory of our allies, what is the use of such a formation? For by remaining on the ground that suits it, not only is it incapable of helping its friends but cannot even ensure its own safety. For the arrival of supplies will easily be prevented by the enemy, when they have undisturbed command of the open country. But if the phalanx leaves the ground proper to it and attempts any action, it will be easily overcome by the enemy. And again, if it is decided to engage the enemy on level ground, but instead of availing ourselves of our total force when the phalanx has its one opportunity for charging, we keep out of action even a small portion of it at the moment of the shock, it is easy to tell what will happen from what the Romans always do at present,

Polybius Histories 18.32
the likelihood of the result Inow indicate requiring no argument but only the evidence of actual facts. For the Romans do not make their line equal in force to the enemy and expose all the legions to a frontal attack by the phalanx, but part of their forces remain in reserve and the rest engage the enemy. Afterwards whether the phalanx drives back by its charge the force opposed to it or is repulsed by this force, its own peculiar formation is broken up. For either in following up a retreating foe or in flying before an attacking foe, they leave behind the other parts of their own army, upon which the enemy's reserve have room enough in the space formerly held by the phalanx to attack no longer in front but appearing by a lateral movement on the flank and rear of the phalanx. When it is thus easy to guard against the opportunities and advantages of the phalanx, but impossible to prevent the enemy from taking advantage of the proper moment to act against it, the one kind of formation naturally proves in reality superior to the other. Again, those who employ the phalanx have to march through and encamp in every variety of country; they are compelled to occupy favourable positions in advance, to besiege certain positions and to be besieged in others, and to meet attacks from quarters the least expected. For all such contingencies are parts of war, and victory sometimes wholly and sometimes very largely depends on them. Now in all these matters the Macedonian formation is at times of little use and at times of no use at all, because the phalanx soldier can be of service neither in detachments nor singly, while the Roman formation is efficient. For every Roman soldier, once he is armed and sets about his business, can adapt himself equally well to every place and time and can meet attack from every quarter. He is likewise equally prepared and equally in condition whether he has to fight together with the whole army or with a part of it or in maniples or singly. So since in all particulars the Romans are much more serviceable, Roman plans are much more apt to result in success than those of others. Ithought it necessary to speak on this subject at some length because many Greeks on the actual occasions when the Macedonians suffered defeat considered the event as almost incredible, and many will still continue to wonder why and how the phalanx comes to be conquered by troops armed in the Roman fashion.

Polybius Histories 18.33
Philipus had done his best in the battle, but on being thus thoroughly defeated, after first picking up as many as he could of the survivors from the battle himself hastily retired through Tempe to Macedonia. He had sent one of his aides-de‑camp on the previous night to Larisa, with orders to destroy and burn the royal correspondence, acting like a true king in not forgetting his duty even in the hour of disaster: for he well knew that if the documents fell into the hands of the Romans he would be giving them much material to use against himself and his friends. Perhaps in the case of others also it has happened that in seasons of prosperity they have not been able to wear their authority with the moderation that befits a man, yet in the hour of danger have exercised due caution and kept their heads, but this was particularly so with Philipus, as will be evident from what Iam about to say. For just as Ihave clearly pointed out his early impulse to do what was right, and again the time, reasons, and circumstances of the change for the worse in him, narrating with documentary proofs his actions after this change, so must Iin the same manner point out his new change of mind and the ability with which, adapting himself to the reverses of fortune, he faced the situation in which he found himself until his death with exceptional prudence. After the battle Flamininus took the requisite steps regarding the prisoners and other booty and then advanced towards Larisa...

Polybius Histories 18.34
He was generally displeased with the overreaching conduct of the Aetolians about the booty, and did not wish, now he had expelled Philipus, to leave them masters of Greece. Also he could ill brook their bragging, when he saw them claiming equal credit with the Romans for the victory and filling the whole of Greece with the story of their prowess. In consequence he was somewhat brusque in his replies when he had interviews with them and kept silent about public affairs, carrying out his projects himself or with the aid of his friends. While these stiff relations on both sides still continued there came a few days after the battle a legation from Philipus composed of Demosthenes, Cycliades, and Limnaeus. Flamininus, after conferring with them at some length in the presence of his military tribunes, granted Philipus an armistice of fifteen days at once, and arranged to return with them to confer with Philipus about the situation during the armistice. As the interview had been conducted with perfect courtesy, the suspicions of Flamininus entertained by the Aetolians became twice as vehement. For since by this time bribery and the notion that no one should do anything gratis were very prevalent in Greece, and so to speak quite current coin among the Aetolians, they could not believe that Flamininus's complete change of attitude towards Philipus could have been brought about without a bribe, since they were ignorant of the Roman principles and practice in this matter, but judged from their own, and calculated that it was probable that Philipus would offer a very large sum owing to his actual situation and Flamininus would not be able to resist the temptation.

Polybius Histories 18.35
If I were dealing with earlier times, I would have confidently asserted about all the Romans in general, that no one of them would do such a thing; Ispeak of the years before they undertook wars across the sea and during which they preserved their own principles and practices. At the present time, however, I would not venture to assert this of all, but I could with perfect confidence say of many particular men in Rome that in this matter they can maintain their faith. That I may not appear to be stating what is impossible, I will cite as evidence the names of two men regarding whom none will dispute my assertion. The first is Lucius Aemilius Paullus, the conqueror of Perseus. For when he became master of the palace of the Macedonian kings, in which, apart from the splendid furniture and other riches, more than six thousand talents of gold and silver were fortified in the treasury alone, not only did he not covet any of his treasure, but did not even wish to look upon it, and disposed of it all by the hands of others, and this although his private fortune was by no means ample, but on the contrary rather meagre. At least when he died not long after the war, and his sons by birth, Publius Scipio and Quintus Fabius Maximus, wished to give back to his wife her dowry of twenty-five talents they found such difficulty in raising the sum that they could not possibly have done it had they not sold the household goods, the slaves, and some real property in addition. If what I say seems incredible to anyone he can easily assure himself of its truth. For though many facts and especially those concerning this matter are subjects of dispute at Rome owing to their political dissensions, still on inquiry you will find that the statement I have just made is acknowledged to be true by all. Again, take the case of Publius Scipio, known as the great. When he became master of Carthage, which was considered the wealthiest city in the world, he took absolutely nothing from it to add to his own fortune, either by purchase or by any other means of acquisition, and this although he was not particularly well off, but only moderately so for a Roman. And not only did he keep his hands off the treasure in Carthage itself, but in general allow any of that from Africa to be mixed up with his private fortune. In the case of this man again anyone who really inquires will find that no one disputes the reputation he enjoyed at Rome in this respect.

Polybius Histories 18.36
But regarding these men, when I find a more suitable opportunity I will speak more at large. Flamininus in the meantime, after fixing on a day to meet Philipus, at once wrote to the allies instructing them at what date they should be present for the conference, and then a few days afterwards came to the entrance of Tempe at the time determined on.When the allies had assembled, and while the council was exclusively composed of them, the Roman proconsul got up and asked them to state severally on what terms peace should be made with Philipus. King Amynander resumed his seat after speaking briefly and with moderation. For he begged them all to take steps for his protection, in case, when the Romans had left Greece, Philipus might vent his anger on him. For, he said, the Athamanians were also easy victims of the Macedonians owing to their weakness and the closeness of the two countries. After him Alexander the Aetolian got up. He praised Flamininus for having called the allies to take part in the Peace Conference and for inviting them now to give their several opinions, but he said he was much mistaken and wide of the mark if he believed that by coming to terms with Philipus he would ensure either peace for the Romans or liberty for the Greeks. For neither of these results was possible; but if he wished to carry out completely the policy of his country and fulfill the promises he had given to all the Greeks, there was but one way of making peace with Macedonia and that was to depose Philipus. To do so, he said, was really quite easy, if he did not let the present opportunity slip. After speaking at some length in the same sense he resumed his seat.

Polybius Histories 18.37
Flamininus spoke next. He said that Alexander was mistaken not only as to the policy of Rome, but as to his own particular design, and especially as to the interests of Greece. For neither did the Romans ever after a single war at once exterminate their adversaries, as was proved by their conduct towards Hannibal and the Carthaginians, at whose hands they had suffered injuries so grievous, but yet afterwards, when it was in their power to treat them exactly as they chose, they had not resolved on any extreme measures. Nor, he said, had he himself ever entertained the idea that they should wage war on Philipus without any hope of reconciliation; but if the king had consented to the conditions imposed on him before the battle, he would gladly have made peace with him. "Therefore it indeed surprises me," he said, "that after taking part in the conferences for peace you are now all irreconcilable. Is it, as seems evident, because we won the battle? But nothing can be more unfeeling. Brave men should be hard on their foes and wroth with them in battle, when conquered they should be courageous and high-minded, but when they conquer, gentle and humane. What you exhort me to do now is exactly the reverse. Again it is in the interest of the Greeks that the Macedonian dominion should be humbled for long, but by no means that it should be destroyed." For in that case, he said, they would very soon experience the lawless violence of the Thracians and Gauls, as they had on more than one occasion. On the whole, he continued, he and the other Romans present judged it proper, if Philipus agreed to do everything that the allies had previously demanded, to grant him peace after first consulting the Senate. As for the Aetolians, they were at liberty to take their own counsel. When Phaeneas after this attempted to say that all that had happened was of no use, for Philipus, if he could wriggle out of the present crisis, would at once begin to re-establish his power, Flamininus interrupted him angrily and without rising from his seat, exclaiming, "Stop talking nonsense, Phaeneas; for Iwill so manage the peace that Philipus will not, even if he wishes it, be able to wrong the Greeks."

Polybius Histories 18.38
On that day they broke up on these terms. Next day the king arrived, and on the following day, when all had assembled at the conference, Philipus entered and with great skill and sound sense cut away the ground on which they all based their violent demands by saying that he yielded to and would execute all the former demands of the Romans and the allies, and that he submitted all other questions to the decision of the Senate. After he had said this, all the others remained silent, but Phaeneas the Aetolian representative said, "Why then, Philipus, do you not give up to us Larisa Cremaste, Pharsalus, Phthiotic Thebes, and Echinus?" Philipus told him to take them, but Flamininus said that they ought not to take any of the other towns, but only Phthiotis Thebes. For the Thebans, when on approaching the town with his army he demanded that they should submit to Rome, had refused. So that, now that they had been reduced by force of arms, he had a right to decide as he chose about them. When, upon this, Phaeneas grew indignant and said that in the first place the Aetolians should, as they had fought side by side with the Romans, receive back the towns which had formerly been members of their League, and next that the same resulted from the terms of their original alliance, by the way the possessions of those captured in war were to go to the Romans and the towns to the Aetolians, Flamininus said they were mistaken on both points. For the alliance had been dissolved, when, deserting the Romans, they made terms with Philipus, and even if it still subsisted, they should receive back and occupy not the towns which had surrendered to the Romans of their own free will, as all the Thessalian cities had now done, but any that had fallen by force of arms.

Polybius Histories 18.39
Flamininus, in speaking thus, pleased the others, but the Aetolians listened to him sullenly, and we may say that the prelude of great evils began to come into being. For it was the spark of this quarrel that set alight the war with the Aetolians and that with Antiochus. What chiefly urged Flamininus to hasten to make peace, was the news that had reached him of Antiochus' having put to sea in Syria with an army directed against Europe. This made him fearful lest Philipus, catching at this hope of support, might shut himself up in his towns and drag on the war, and that on the arrival of another consul, the principal glory of his achievement would be lost to him and reflected on his successor. He therefore yielded to the king's request and allowed him an armistice of four months. He was at once to pay Flamininus the two hundred talents and give his son Demetrius with some other of his friends as hostages, sending to Rome to submit the whole question to the Senate. They now separated after exchanging mutual pledges about the whole question, Flamininus engaging, if the peace were not finally made, to return the two hundred talents and the hostages. After this all the parties sent to Rome, some working for the peace and others against it....

Polybius Histories 18.40
What can the reason be that we all, though deceived by the same means and through the same persons, cannot yet give over folly? For this sort of fraud had been practiced often and by many. It is perhaps not surprising that it succeeds with others, but it is indeed astonishing that it does so with those who are the very fount of such trickery. The reason however is that we do not bear in mind Epicharmus's excellent advice, "Be sober and mindful to mistrust; these are the thews of the mind."