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I. From the Preface
Polybius Histories 6 .2
I am aware that some will wonder why I have deferred until
the present occasion my account of the Roman constitution, thus being
obliged to interrupt the due course of my narrative. Now, that
I have always regarded this account as one of the essential parts
of my whole design, I have, I am sure, made evident in
numerous passages and chiefly in the prefatory remarks dealing with the
fundamental principles of this history, where I said that the best
and most valuable result I aim at is that readers of my work may
gain a knowledge how it was and by virtue of what peculiar political
institutions that in less than in fifty-three years nearly the whole
world was overcome and fell under the single dominion of Rome, a thing
the like of which had never happened before. Having made up my
mind to deal with the matter, I found no occasion more suitable
than the present for turning my attention to the constitution and
testing the truth of what I am about to say on the subject.
For just as those who pronounce in private on the characters of
bad or good men, do not, when they really resolve to put their opinion
to the test, choose for investigation those periods of their life which
they passed in composure and repose, but seasons when they were
afflicted by adversity or blessed with success, deeming the sole test
of a perfect man to be the power of bearing high-mindedly and bravely
the most complete reverses of fortune, so it should be in our judgement
of states. Therefore, as I could not see any greater or more
violent change in the fortunes of the Romans than this which has
happened in our own times, I reserved my account of the
constitution for the present occasion. . . . What
chiefly attracts and chiefly benefits students of history is just this
— the study of causes and the consequent power of choosing what is best
in each case. Now the chief cause of success or the reverse in
all matters is the form of a state's constitution; for springing
from this, as from a fountain-head, all designs and plans of action not
only originate, but reach their consummation.
Polybius Histories 6.3
In the case of those Greek states which have often risen to
greatness and have often experienced a complete change of fortune, it
is an easy matter both to describe their past and to pronounce as to
their future. For there is no difficulty in reporting the known
facts, and it is not hard to foretell the future by inference from the
past. But about the Roman state it is neither at all easy to
explain the present situation owing to the complicated character of the
constitution, nor to foretell the future owing to our ignorance of the
peculiar features of public and private life at Rome in the past.
Particular attention and study are therefore required if one
wishes to attain a clear general view of the distinctive qualities of
their constitution. Most of those whose object it has been to
instruct us methodically concerning such matters, distinguish three
kinds of constitutions, which they call kingship, aristocracy, and
democracy. Now we should, I think, be quite justified in
asking them to enlighten us as to whether they represent these three to
be the sole varieties or rather to be the best; for in either
case my opinion is that they are wrong. For it is evident that we must
regard as the best constitution a combination of all these three
varieties, since we have had proof of this not only theoretically but
by actual experience, Lycurgus having been the first to draw up a
constitution that of Sparta on this principle. Nor on the
other hand can we admit that these are the only three varieties; for we
have witnessed monarchical and tyrannical governments, which while they
differ very widely from kingship, yet bear a certain resemblance to it,
this being the reason why monarchs in general falsely assume and
use, as far as they can, the regal title. There have also been
several oligarchical constitutions which seem to bear some likeness to
aristocratic ones, though the divergence is, generally, as wide as
possible. The same holds good about democracies.
Polybius Histories 6.4
The truth of what I say is evident from the following
considerations. It is by no means every monarchy which we can call
straight off a kingship, but only that which is voluntarily accepted by
the subjects and where they are governed rather by an appeal to their
reason than by fear and force. Nor again can we style every
oligarchy an aristocracy, but only that where the government is in the
hands of a selected body of the justest and wisest men. Similarly
that is no true democracy in which the whole crowd of citizens is free
to do whatever they wish or purpose, but when, in a community
where it is traditional and customary to reverence the gods, to honour
our parents, to respect our elders, and to obey the laws, the will of
the greater number prevails, this is to be called a democracy. We
should therefore assert that there are six kinds of governments, the
three above mentioned which are in everyone's mouth and the three which
are naturally allied to them, I mean monarchy, oligarchy, and
mob-rule. Now the first of these to come into being is monarchy,
its growth being natural and unaided; and next arises kingship derived
from monarchy by the aid of art and by the correction of defects.
Monarchy first changes into its vicious allied form, tyranny; and
next, the abolishment of both gives birth to aristocracy.
Aristocracy by its very nature degenerates into oligarchy; and
when the commons inflamed by anger take vengeance on this government
for its unjust rule, democracy comes into being; and in due course the
licence and lawlessness of this form of government produces mob-rule to
complete the series. The truth of what I have just said will
be quite clear to anyone who pays due attention to such beginnings,
origins, and changes as are in each case natural. For he alone
who has seen how each form naturally arises and develops, will be able
to see when, how, and where the growth, perfection, change, and end of
each are likely to occur again. And it is to the Roman
constitution above all that this method, I think, may be
successfully applied, since from the outset its formation and growth
have been due to natural causes.
Polybius Histories 6.5
Perhaps this theory of the natural transformations into each other of
the different forms of government is more elaborately set forth by
Plato and certain other philosophers; but as the arguments are subtle
and are stated at great length, they are beyond the reach of all but a
few. I therefore will attempt to give a short summary of the
theory, as far as I consider it to apply to the actual history of
facts and to appeal to the common intelligence of mankind. For if
there appear to be certain omissions in my general exposition of it,
the detailed discussion which follows will afford the reader ample
compensation for any difficulties now left unsolved. What then
are the beginnings I speak of and what is the first origin of
political societies? When owing to floods, famines, failure of
crops or other such causes there occurs such a destruction of the human
race as tradition tells us has more than once happened, and as we must
believe will often happen again, all arts and crafts perishing at
the same time, then in the course of time, when springing from the
survivors as from seeds men have again increased in numbers and
just like other animals form herds — it being a matter of course that
they too should herd together with those of their kind owing to their
natural weakness — it is a necessary consequence that the man who
excels in bodily strength and in courage will lead and rule over the
rest. We observe and should regard as a most genuine work of
nature this very phenomenon in the case of the other animals which act
purely by instinct and among whom the strongest are always indisputably
the masters — I speak of bulls, boars, cocks, and the like.
It is probable then that at the beginning men lived thus, herding
together like animals and following the lead of the strongest and
bravest, the ruler's strength being here the sole limit to his power
and the name we should give his rule being monarchy. But when in
time feelings of sociability and companionship begin to grow in such
gatherings of men, than kingship has struck root; and the notions of
goodness, justice, and their opposites begin to arise in men.
Polybius Histories 6.6
The manner in which these notions come into being is as follows.
Men being all naturally inclined to sexual intercourse, and the
consequence of this being the birth of children, whenever one of those
who have been reared does not on growing up show gratitude to those who
reared him or defend them, but on the contrary takes to speaking ill of
them or ill treating them, it is evident that he will displease and
offend those who have been familiar with his parents and have witnessed
the care and pains they spent on attending to and feeding their
children. For seeing that men are distinguished from the other
animals by possessing the faculty of reason, it is obviously improbable
that such a difference of conduct should escape them, as it escapes the
other animals: they will notice the thing and be displeased at
what is going on, looking to the future and reflecting that they may
all meet with the same treatment. Again when a man who has been
helped or succoured when in danger by another does not show gratitude
to his preserver, but even goes to the length of attempting to do him
injury, it is clear that those who become aware of it will naturally be
displeased and offended by such conduct, sharing the resentment of
their injured neighbour and imagining themselves in the same situation.
From all this there arises in everyone a notion of the meaning
and theory of duty, which is the beginning and end of justice.
Similarly, again, when any man is foremost in defending his
fellows from danger, and braves and awaits the onslaught of the most
powerful beasts, it is natural that he should receive marks of favour
and honour from the people, while the man who acts in the opposite
manner will meet with reprobation and dislike. From this again
some idea of what is base and what is noble and of what constitutes the
difference is likely to arise among the people; and noble conduct will
be admired and imitated because it is advantageous, while base conduct
will be avoided. Now when the leading and most powerful man among
the people always throws the weight of his authority on the side of the
notions on such matters which generally prevail, and when in the
opinion of his subjects he apportions rewards and penalties according
to desert, they yield obedience to him no longer because they fear his
force, but rather because their judgement approves him; and they join
in maintaining his rule even if he is quite enfeebled by age, defending
him with one consent and battling against those who conspire to
overthrow his rule. Thus by insensible degrees the monarch
becomes a king, ferocity and force having yielded the supremacy to
reason.
Polybius Histories 6.7
Thus is formed naturally among men the first notion of goodness
and justice, and their opposites; this is the beginning and birth of
true kingship. For the people maintain the supreme power not only
in the hands of these men themselves, but in those of their
descendants, from the conviction that those born from and reared by
such men will also have principles like to theirs. And if they
ever are displeased with the descendants, they now choose their kings
and rulers no longer for their bodily strength and brute courage, but
for the excellency of their judgement and reasoning powers, as they
have gained experience from actual facts of the difference between the
one class of qualities and the other. In old times, then, those
who had once been chosen to the royal office continued to hold it until
they grew old, fortifying and enclosing fine strongholds with walls and
acquiring lands, in the one case for the sake of the security of their
subjects and in the other to provide them with abundance of the
necessities of life. And while pursuing these aims, they were
exempt from all vituperation or jealousy, as neither in their dress nor
in their food did they make any great distinction, they lived very much
like everyone else, not keeping apart from the people. But when
they received the office by hereditary succession and found their
safety now provided for, and more than sufficient provision of food,
they gave way to their appetites owing to this superabundance,
and came to think that the rulers must be distinguished from their
subjects by a peculiar dress, that there should be a peculiar luxury
and variety in the dressing and serving of their viands, and that they
should meet with no denial in the pursuit of their amours, however
lawless. These habits having given rise in the one case to envy
and offence and in the other to an outburst of hatred and passionate
resentment, the kingship changed into a tyranny; the first steps
towards its overthrow were taken by the subjects, and conspiracies
began to be formed. These conspiracies were not the work of the
worst men, but of the noblest, most high-spirited, and most courageous,
because such men are least able to brook the insolence of princes.
Polybius Histories 6.8
The people now having got leaders, would combine with them against
the ruling powers for the reasons I stated above; kingship and
monarchy would be utterly abolished, and in their place aristocracy
would begin to grow. For the commons, as if bound to pay at once
their debt of gratitude to the abolishers of monarchy, would make them
their leaders and entrust their destinies to them. At first these
chiefs gladly assumed this charge and regarded nothing as of greater
importance than the common interest, administering the private and
public affairs of the people with paternal solicitude. But here
again when children inherited this position of authority from their
fathers, having no experience of misfortune and none at all of civil
equality and liberty of speech, and having been brought up from the
cradle amid the evidences of the power and high position of their
fathers, they abandoned themselves some to greed of gain and
unscrupulous money-making, others to indulgence in wine and the
convivial excess which accompanies it, and others again to the
violation of women and the rape of boys; and thus converting the
aristocracy into an oligarchy aroused in the people feelings similar to
those of which I just spoke, and in consequence met with the same
disastrous end as the tyrant.
Polybius Histories 6.9
For whenever anyone who has noticed the jealousy and hatred with
which you are regarded by the citizens, has the courage to speak or act
against the chiefs of the state he has the whole mass of the people
ready to back him. Next, when they have either killed or banished
the oligarchs, they no longer venture to set a king over them, as they
still remember with terror the injustice they suffered from the former
ones, nor can they entrust the government with confidence to a select
few, with the evidence before them of their recent error in doing so.
Thus the only hope still surviving unimpaired is in themselves,
and to this they resort, making the state a democracy instead of an
oligarchy and assuming the responsibility for the conduct of affairs.
Then as long as some of those survive who experienced the evils
of oligarchical dominion, they are well pleased with the present form
of government, and set a high value on equality and freedom of speech.
But when a new generation arises and the democracy falls into the hands
of the grandchildren of its founders, they have become so accustomed to
freedom and equality that they no longer value them, and begin to aim
at pre-eminence; and it is chiefly those of ample fortune who fall into
this error. So when they begin to lust for power and cannot
attain it through themselves or their own good qualities, they ruin
their estates, tempting and corrupting the people in every possible
way. And hence when by their foolish thirst for reputation they
have created among the masses an appetite for gifts and the habit of
receiving them, democracy in its turn is abolished and changes into a
rule of force and violence. For the people, having grown
accustomed to feed at the expense of others and to depend for their
livelihood on the property of others, as soon as they find a leader who
is enterprising but is excluded from the houses of office by his
penury, institute the rule of violence; and now uniting their
forces massacre, banish, and plunder, until they degenerate again into
perfect savages and find once more a master and monarch. Such is
the cycle of political revolution, the course appointed by nature in
which constitutions change, disappear, and finally return to the point
from which they started. Anyone who clearly perceives this may
indeed in speaking of the future of any state be wrong in his estimate
of the time the process will take, but if his judgement is not tainted
by animosity or jealousy, he will very seldom be mistaken as to the
stage of growth or decline it has reached, and as to the form into
which it will change. And especially in the case of the Roman
state will this method enable us to arrive at a knowledge of its
formation, growth, and greatest perfection, and likewise of the change
for the worse which is sure to follow some day. For, as
I said, this state, more than any other, has been formed and has
grown naturally, and will undergo a natural decline and change to its
contrary. The reader will be able to judge of the truth of this
from the subsequent parts of this work.
Polybius Histories 6.10
At present I will give a brief account of the legislation of
Lycurgus, a matter not alien to my present purpose. Lycurgus had
perfectly well understood that all the above changes take place
necessarily and naturally, and had taken into consideration that every
variety of constitution which is simple and formed on principle is
precarious, as it is soon perverted into the corrupt form which is
proper to it and naturally follows on it. For just as rust in the
case of iron and wood-worms and ship-worms in the case of timber are
inbred pests, and these substances, even though they escape all
external injury, fall a prey to the evils engendered in them, so each
constitution has a vice engendered in it and inseparable from it. In
kingship it is despotism, in aristocracy oligarchy, and in
democracy the savage rule of violence; and it is impossible, as
I said above, that each of these should not in course of time
change into this vicious form. Lycurgus, then, foreseeing this,
did not make his constitution simple and uniform, but united in it all
the good and distinctive features of the best governments, so that none
of the principles should grow unduly and be perverted into its allied
evil, but that, the force of each being neutralized by that of the
others, neither of them should prevail and outbalance another, but that
the constitution should remain for long in a state of equilibrium like
a well-trimmed boat, kingship being guarded from arrogance by the fear
of the commons, who were given a sufficient share in the government,
and the commons on the other hand not venturing to treat the kings with
contempt from fear of the elders, who being selected from the best
citizens would be sure all of them to be always on the side of justice;
so that that part of the state which was weakest owing to its
subservience to traditional custom, acquired power and weight by the
support and influence of the elders. The consequence was that by
drawing up his constitution thus he preserved liberty at Sparta for a
longer period than is recorded elsewhere. Lycurgus then,
foreseeing, by a process of reasoning, whence and how events naturally
happen, constructed his constitution untaught by adversity, but
the Romans while they have arrived at the same final result as regards
their form of government, have not reached it by any process of
reasoning, but by the discipline of many struggles and troubles, and
always choosing the best by the light of the experience gained in
disaster have thus reached the same result as Lycurgus, that is to say,
the best of all existing constitutions.
Polybius Histories 6.11
From the crossing of Xerxes to Greece . . . and for thirty
years after this period, it was always one of those polities which was
an object of special study, and it was at its best and nearest to
perfection at the time of the Hannibalic war, the period at which
I interrupted my narrative to deal with it. Therefore now
that I have described its growth, I will explain what were
the conditions at the time when by their defeat at Cannae the Romans
were brought face to face with disaster. I am quite aware
that to those who have been born and bred under the Roman Republic my
account of it will seem somewhat imperfect owing to the omission of
certain details. For as they have complete knowledge of it and
practical acquaintance with all its parts, having been familiar with
these customs and institutions from childhood, they will not be struck
by the extent of the information I give but will demand in
addition all I have omitted: they will not think that the author
has purposely omitted small peculiarities, but owing to ignorance he
has been silent regarding the origins of many things and some points of
capital importance. Had I mentioned them, they would not
have been impressed by my doing so, regarding them as small and trivial
points, but as they are omitted they will demand their inclusion as if
they were vital matters, through a desire themselves to appear better
informed than the author. Now a good critic should not judge
authors by what they omit, but by what they relate, and if he finds any
falsehood in this, he may conclude that the omissions are due to
ignorance; but if all the writer says is true, he should admit
that he has been silent about these matters deliberately and not from
ignorance. These remarks are meant for those who find fault with
authors in cavilling rather than just spirit. . . .
In so far as any view of matter we form applies to the right
occasion, so far expressions of approval or blame are sound. When
circumstances change, and when applied to these changed conditions, the
most excellent and true reflections of authors seem often not only not
acceptable, but utterly offensive. . . . The three
kinds of government that I spoke of above all shared in the
control of the Roman state. And such fairness and propriety in all
respects was shown in the use of these three elements for drawing up
the constitution and in its subsequent administration that it was
impossible even for a native to pronounce with certainty whether the
whole system was aristocratic, democratic, or monarchical. This was
indeed only natural. For if one fixed one's eyes on the power of
the consuls, the constitution seemed completely monarchical and royal;
if on that of the senate it seemed again to be aristocratic; and when
one looked at the power of the masses, it seemed clearly to be a
democracy. The parts of the state falling under the control of
each element were and with a few modifications still are as
follows.
Polybius Histories 6.12
The consuls, previous to leading out their legions, exercise
authority in Rome over all public affairs, since all the other
magistrates except the tribunes are under them and bound to obey them,
and it is they who introduce embassies to the senate. Besides
this it is they who consult the senate on matters of urgency, they who
carry out in detail the provisions of its decrees. Again as concerns
all affairs of state administered by the people it is their duty to
take these under their charge, to summon assemblies, to introduce
measures, and to preside over the execution of the popular decrees. As
for preparation for war and the general conduct of operations in the
field, here their power is almost uncontrolled; for they are empowered
to make what demands they choose on the allies, to appoint military
tribunes, to levy soldiers and select those who are fittest for
service. They also have the right of inflicting, when on active
service, punishment on anyone under their command; and they are
authorized to spend any sum they decide upon from the public funds,
being accompanied by a quaestor who faithfully executes their
instructions. So that if one looks at this part of the
administration alone, one may reasonably pronounce the constitution to
be a pure monarchy or kingship. 1 I may remark that any
changes in these matters or in others of which I am about to speak
that may be made in present or future times do not in any way affect
the truth of the views I here state.
Polybius Histories 6.13
To pass to the senate. In the first place it has the control of the
treasury, all revenue and expenditure being regulated by it. For
with the exception of payments made to the consuls, the quaestors are
not allowed to disburse for any particular object without a decree of
the senate. And even the item of expenditure which is far heavier
and more important than any other — the outlay every five years by the
censors on public works, whether constructions or repairs — is under
the control of the senate, which makes a grant to the censors for the
purpose. Similarly crimes committed in Italy which require a
public investigation, such as treason, conspiracy, poisoning, and
assassination, are under the jurisdiction of the senate. Also if
any private person or community in Italy is in need of arbitration or
indeed claims damages or requires succor or protection, the senate
attends to all such matters. It also occupies itself with the dispatch
of all embassies sent to countries outside of Italy for the purpose
either of settling differences, or of offering friendly advice, or
indeed of imposing demands, or of receiving submission, or of declaring
war; and in like manner with respect to embassies arriving in
Rome it decides what reception and what answer should be given to them.
All these matters are in the hands of the senate, nor have the people
anything whatever to do with them. So that again to one residing
in Rome during the absence of the consuls the constitution appears to
be entirely aristocratic; and this is the conviction of many
Greek states and many of the kings, as the senate manages all business
connected with them.
Polybius Histories 6.14
After this we are naturally inclined to ask what part in the
constitution is left for the people, considering that the senate
controls all the particular matters I mentioned, and, what is most
important, manages all matters of revenue and expenditure, and
considering that the consuls again have uncontrolled authority as
regards armaments and operations in the field. But nevertheless
there is a part and a very important part left for the people.
For it is the people which alone has the right to confer honours
and inflict punishment, the only bonds by which kingdoms and states and
in a word human society in general are held together. For where
the distinction between these is overlooked or is observed but ill
applied, no affairs can be properly administered. How indeed is this
possible when good and evil men are held in equal estimation? It
is by the people, then, in many cases the offenses punishable by a fine
are tried when the accused have held the highest office; and they are
the only court which may try on capital charges. As regards the
latter they have a practice which is praiseworthy and should be
mentioned. Their usage allows those on trial for their lives when found
guilty liberty to depart openly, thus inflicting voluntary exile on
themselves, if even only one of the tribes that pronounce the verdict
has not yet voted. Such exiles enjoy safety in the territories of
Naples, Praeneste, Tibur, and other civitates foederatae. Again
it is the people who bestow office on the deserving, the noblest regard
of virtue in a state; the people have the power of approving or
rejecting laws, and what is most important of all, they deliberate on
the question of war and peace. Further in the case of alliances, terms
of peace, and treaties, it is the people who ratify all these or the
reverse. 1 Thus here again one might plausibly say that the
people's share in the government is the greatest, and that the
constitution is a democratic one.
Polybius Histories 6.15
Having stated how political power is distributed among the different
parts of the state, I will now explain how each of the three parts
is enabled, if they wish, the counteract or co-operate with the others.
The consul, when he leaves with his army invested with the powers
I mentioned, appears indeed to have absolute authority in all
matters necessary for carrying out his purpose; but in fact he requires
the support of the people and the senate, and is not able to bring his
operations to a conclusion without them. For it is obvious that
the legions require constant supplies, and without the consent of the
senate, neither corn, clothing, nor pay can be provided; so that
the commander's plans come to nothing, if the senate chooses to be
deliberately negligent and obstructive. It also depends on the
senate whether or not a general can carry out completely his
conceptions and designs, since it has the right of either superseding
him when his year's term of office has expired or of retaining him in
command. Again it is in its power to celebrate with pomp and to
magnify the successes of a general or on the other hand to obscure and
belittle them. For the processions they call triumphs, in which
the generals bring the actual spectacle of their achievements before
the eyes of their fellow-citizens, cannot be properly organized and
sometimes even cannot be held at all, unless the senate consents and
provides the requisite funds. As for the people it is most
indispensable for the consuls to conciliate them, however far away from
home they may be; for, as I said, it is the people which ratifies
or annuls terms of peace and treaties, and what is most important, on
laying down office the consuls are obliged to account for their actions
to the people. 11 So that in no respect is it safe for the consuls
to neglect keeping in favour with both the senate and the
people.
Polybius Histories 6.16
The senate again, which possesses such great power, is obliged in
the first place to pay attention to the commons in public affairs and
respect the wishes of the people, and it cannot carry out
inquiries into the most grave and important offences against the state,
punishable with death, and their correction, unless the senatus
consultum is confirmed by the people. The same is the case in
matters which directly affect the senate itself. For if anyone
introduces a law meant to deprive the senate of some of its traditional
authority, or to abolish the precedence and other distinctions of the
senators or even to curtail them of their private fortunes, it is the
people alone which has the power of passing or rejecting any such
measure. And what is most important is that if a single one of
the tribunes interposes, the senate is unable to decide finally about
any matter, and cannot even meet and hold sittings; and here it
is to be observed that the tribunes are always obliged to act as the
people decree and to pay every attention to their wishes. Therefore for
all these reasons the senate is afraid of the masses and must pay due
attention to the popular will.
Polybius Histories 6.17
Similarly, again, the people must be submissive to the senate and
respect its members both in public and in private. Through the
whole of Italy a vast number of contracts, which it would not be easy
to enumerate, are given out by the censors for the construction and
repair of public buildings, and besides this there are many things
which are farmed, such as navigable rivers, harbours, gardens, mines,
lands, in fact everything that forms part of the Roman dominion.
Now all these matters are undertaken by the people, and one may
almost say that everyone is interested in these contracts and the work
they involved. For certain people are the actual purchasers from
the censors of the contracts, others are the partners of these first,
others stand surety for them, others pledge their own fortunes to the
state for this purpose. Now in all these matters the senate is
supreme. It can grant extension of time; it can relieve the contractor
if any accident occurs; and if the work proves to be absolutely
impossible to carry out it can liberate him from his contract.
There are in fact many ways in which the senate can either
benefit or indicate those who manage public property, as all these
matters are referred to it. What is even most important is that
the judges in most civil trials, whether public or private, are
appointed from its members, where the action involves large interests.
So that all citizens being at the mercy of the senate, and
looking forward with alarm to the uncertainty of litigation, are very
shy of obstructing or resisting its decisions. Similarly everyone
is reluctant to oppose the projects of the consuls as all are generally
and individually under their authority when in the
field.
Polybius Histories 6.18
Such being the power that each part has of hampering the others or
co-operating with them, their union is adequate to all emergencies, so
that it is impossible to find a better political system than this.
For whenever the menace of some common danger from abroad compels
them to act in concord and support each other, so great does the
strength of the state become, that nothing which is requisite can be
neglected, as all are zealously competing in devising means of meeting
the need of the hour, nor can any decision arrived at fail to be
executed promptly, as all are co-operating both in public and in
private to the accomplishment of the task which they have set
themselves; and consequently this peculiar form of constitution
possesses an irresistible power of attaining every object upon which it
is resolved. When again they are freed from external menace, and
reap the harvest of good fortune and affluence which is the result of
their success, and in the enjoyment of this prosperity are corrupted by
flattery and idleness and wax insolent and overbearing, as indeed
happens often enough, it is then especially that we see the state
providing itself a remedy for the evil from which it suffers. For
when one part having grown out of proportion to the others aims at
supremacy and tends to become too predominant, it is evident that, as
for the reasons above given none of the three is absolute, but the
purpose of the one can be counterworked and thwarted by the others,
none of them will excessively outgrow the others or treat them with
contempt. All in fact remains in statu quo, on the one hand,
because any aggressive impulse is sure to be checked and from the
outset each estate stands in dread of being interfered with by the
others. . . .
Polybius Histories 6.19
After electing the consuls, they appoint military tribunes, fourteen
from those who have seen five years' service and ten from those
who have seen ten. As for the rest, a cavalry soldier must serve for
ten years in all and an infantry soldier for sixteen years before
reaching the age of forty-six, with the exception of those whose census
is under four hundred drachmae, all of whom are employed in naval
service. In case of pressing danger twenty years' service is demanded
from the infantry. No one is eligible for any political office
before he has completed ten years' service. The consuls, when they are
about to enrol soldiers, announce at a meeting of the popular assembly
the day on which all Roman citizens of military age must present
themselves, and this they do annually. On the appointed day, when
those liable to service arrive in Rome, and assemble on the Capitol,
the junior tribunes divide themselves into four groups, as the popular
assembly or the consuls determine, since the main and original division
of their forces is into four legions. The four tribunes first nominated
are appointed to the first legion, the next three to the second, the
following four to the third, and the last three to the fourth. Of
senior tribunes the first two are appointed to the first legion, the
next three to the second, the next two to the third, and the three last
to the fourth.
Polybius Histories 6.20
The division and appointment of the tribunes having
thus been so made that each legion has the same number of officers,
those of each legion take their seats apart, and they draw lots
for the tribes, and summon them singly in the order of the lottery.
From each tribe they first of all select four lads of more or
less the same age and physique. When these are brought forward
the officers of the first legion have first choice, those of the second
choice, those of the third, and those of the fourth last. Another
batch of four is now brought forward, and this time the officers of the
second legion have first choice and so on, those of the first choosing
last. A third batch having been brought forward the tribunes
of the third legion choose first, and those of the second last.
By thus continuing to give each legion first choice in turn, each
gets men of the same standard. When they have chosen the number
determined on — that is when the strength of each legion is brought up
to four thousand two hundred, or in times of exceptional danger to five
thousand — the old system was to choose the cavalry after the
four thousand two hundred infantry, but they now choose them first, the
censor selecting them according to their wealth; and three hundred are
assigned to each legion.
Polybius Histories 6.21
The enrolment having been completed in this manner, those of the
tribunes on whom this duty falls collect the newly-enrolled soldiers,
and picking out of the whole body a single man whom they think the most
suitable make him take the oath that he will obey his officers and
execute their orders as far as is in his power. Then the others
come forward and each in his turn takes his oath simply that he will do
the same as the first man. At the same time the consuls send
their orders to the allied cities in Italy which they wish to
contribute troops, stating the numbers required and the day and place
at which the men selected must present themselves. The
magistrates, choosing the men and administering the oath in the manner
above described, send them off, appointing a commander and a paymaster.
The tribunes in Rome, after administering the oath, fix for each
legion a day and place at which the men are to present themselves
without arms and then dismiss them. When they come to the
rendezvous, they choose the youngest and poorest to form the velites;
the next to them are made hastati; those in the prime of life
principes; and the oldest of all triarii, these being the names
among the Romans of the four classes in each legion distinct in age and
equipment. They divide them so that the senior men known as
triarii number six hundred, the principes twelve hundred, the hastati
twelve hundred, the rest, consisting of the youngest, being velites. If
the legion consists of more than four thousand men, they divide
accordingly, except as regards the triarii, the number of whom is
always the same.
Polybius Histories 6.22
>The youngest soldiers or velites are ordered to carry a sword,
javelins, and a target (parma). The target is strongly made and
sufficiently large to afford protection, being circular and measuring
three feet in diameter. They also wear a plain helmet, and
sometimes cover it with a wolf's skin or something similar both to
protect and to act as a distinguishing mark by which their officers can
recognize them and judge if they fight pluckily or not. The
wooden shaft of the javelin measures about two cubits in length and is
about a finger's breadth in thickness; its head is a span long hammered
out to such a fine edge that it is necessarily bent by the first
impact, and the enemy is unable to return it. If this were not so, the
missile would be available for both sides.
Polybius Histories 6.23
The next in seniority called hastati are ordered to wear a complete
panoply. The Roman panoply consists firstly of a shield (scutum),
the convex surface of which measures two and a half feet in width and
four feet in length, the thickness at the rim being a palm's
breadth. It is made of two planks glued together, the outer
surface being then covered first with canvas and then with calf-skin.
Its upper and lower rims are strengthened by an iron edging which
protects it from descending blows and from injury when rested on the
ground. It also has an iron boss (umbo) fixed to it which turns aside
the most formidable blows of stones, pikes, and heavy missiles in
general. Besides the shield they also carry a sword, hanging on
the right thigh and called a Spanish sword. This is excellent for
thrusting, and both of its edges cut effectually, as the blade is very
strong and firm. In addition they have two pila, a brass helmet,
and greaves. The pila are of two sorts stout and fine. Of the
stout ones some are round and a palm's length in diameter and
others are a palm square. Fine pila, which they carry in addition to
the stout ones, are like moderate-sized hunting-spears, 0 the
length of the haft in all cases being about three cubits. Each is
fitted with a barbed iron head of the same length as the haft.
This they attach so securely to the haft, carrying the attachment
halfway up the latter and fixing it with numerous rivets, that in
action the iron will break sooner than become detached, although its
thickness at the bottom where it comes in contact with the wood is a
finger's breadth and a half; such great care do they take about
attaching it firmly. Finally they wear as an ornament a circle of
feathers with three upright purple or black feathers about a cubit in
height, the addition of which on the head surmounting their other arms
is to make every man look twice his real height, and to give him a fine
appearance, such as will strike terror into the enemy. The common
soldiers wear in addition a breastplate of brass a span square, which
they place in front of the heart and call the heart-protector
(pectorale), this completing their accoutrements; but those who are
rated above ten thousand drachmas wear instead of this a coat of
chain-mail (lorica). The principes and triarii are armed in the same
manner except that instead of the pila the triarii carry long spears
(hastae).
Polybius Histories 6.24
From each of the classes except the youngest they elect ten
centurions according to merit, and then they elect a second ten.
All these are called centurions, and the first man elected has a
seat in the military council. The centurions then appoint an equal
number of rearguard officers (optiones). Next, in conjunction with the
centurions, they divide each class into ten companies, except the
velites, and assign to each company two centurions and two optiones
from among the elected officers. The velites are divided equally among
all the companies; these companies are called ordines or manipuli or
vexilla, and their officers are called centurions or ordinum ductores.
Finally these officers appoint from the ranks two of the finest
and bravest men to be standard-bearers (vexillarii) in each maniple.
It is natural that they should appoint two commanders for each
maniple; for it being uncertain what may be the conduct of an officer
or what may happen to him, and affairs of war not admitting of pretexts
and excuses, they wish the maniple never to be without a leader and
chief. When both centurions are on the spot, the first elected commands
the right half of the maniple and the second the left, but if both are
not present the one who is commands the whole. They wish the centurions
not so much to be venturesome and daredevil as to be natural leaders,
of a steady and sedate spirit. They do not desire them so much to
be men who will initiate attacks and open the battle, but men who will
hold their ground when worsted and hard-pressed and be ready to die at
their posts.
Polybius Histories 6.25
In like manner they divide the cavalry into ten squadrons
(turmae) and from each they select three officers (decuriones), who
themselves appoint three rear-rank officers optiones). The first
commander chosen commands the whole squadron, and the two others have
the rank of decuriones, all three bearing this title. If the first of
them should not be present, the second takes command of the squadron.
The cavalry are now armed like that of Greece, but in old times
they had no cuirasses but fought in light undergarments, the result of
which was that they were able to dismount and mount again at once with
great dexterity and facility, but were exposed to great danger in close
combat, as they were nearly naked. Their lances too were
unserviceable in two respects. In the first place they made them so
slender and pliant that it was impossible to take a steady aim, and
before they could fix the head in anything, the shaking due to the mere
motion of the horse caused most of them to break. Next, as they
did not fit the butt-ends with spikes, they could only deliver the
first stroke with the point and after this if they broke they were of
no further service. Their buckler was made of ox-hide, somewhat
similar in shape to the round bosse cakes used at sacrifices. They were
not of any use for attacking, as they were not firm enough; and when
the leather covering peeled off and rotted owing to the rain,
unserviceable as they were before, they now became entirely so.
Since therefore their arms did not stand the test of experience,
they soon took to making them in the Greek fashion, which ensures that
the first stroke of the lance-head shall be both well aimed and
telling, since the lance is so constructed as to be steady and strong,
and also that it may continue to be effectively used by reversing it
and striking with the spike at the butt end. And the same applies
to the Greek shields, which being of solid and firm texture do good
service both in defence and attack. The Romans, when they noticed
this, soon learnt to copy the Greek arms; for this too is one of their
virtues, that no people are so ready to adopt new fashions and imitate
what they see is better in others.
Polybius Histories 6.26
The tribunes having thus organized the troops and ordered them to
arm themselves in this manner, dismiss them to their homes. When
the day comes on which they have all sworn to attend at the place
appointed by the consuls each consul as a rule appointing a
separate rendezvous for his own troops, since each has received his
share of the allies and two Roman legions none of those on the
roll ever fail to appear, no excuse at all being admitted except
adverse omens or absolute impossibility. The allies having now
assembled also at the same places as the Romans, their organization and
command are undertaken by the officers appointed by the consuls known
as praefecti sociorum and twelve in number. They first of all
select for the consuls for the whole force of allies assembled the
horsemen and footmen most fitted for actual service, these being known
as extraordinarii, that is "select." The total number of allied
infantry is usually equal to that of the Romans, while the cavalry are
three times as many. Of these they assign about a third of the
cavalry and a fifth of the infantry to the picked corps; the rest
they divide into two bodies, one known as the right wing and the other
as the left. When these arrangements have been made, the tribunes take
both the Romans and allies and pitch their camp, one simple plan of
camp being adopted at all times and in all places. I think,
therefore, it will be in place here to attempt, as far as words can do
so, to convey to my readers a notion of the disposition of the forces
when on the march, when encamped, and when in action. For who is
so averse to all noble and excellent performance as not to be inclined
to take a little extra trouble to understand matters like this, of
which when he has once read he will be well informed about one of those
things really worth studying and worth knowing?
Polybius Histories 6.27
The manner in which they form their camp is as follows. When the
site for the camp has been chosen, the position in it giving the best
general view and most suitable for issuing orders is assigned to the
general's tent (praetorium). Fixing an ensign on the spot where
they are about to pitch it, they measure off round this ensign a square
plot of ground each side of which is one hundred podes distant, so that
the total area measure four plethra . Along one side of this
square in the direction which seems to give the greatest facilities for
watering and foraging, the Roman legions are disposed as follows.
As I have said, there are six tribunes in each legion; and
since each consul has always two Roman legions with him, it is evident
that there are twelve tribunes in the army of each. They place
then the tents of these all in one line parallel to the side of the
square selected and fifty podes distant from it, to give room for the
horses, mules, and baggage of the tribunes. These tents are
pitched with their backs turned to the praetorium and facing the outer
side of the camp, a direction of which I will always speak as "the
front." The tents of the tribunes are at an equal distance from
each other, and at such a distance that they extend along the whole
breadth of the space occupied by the legions.
Polybius Histories 6.28
They now measure one hundred podes from the front of all these
tents, and starting from the line drawn at this distance parallel to
the tents of the tribunes they begin to encamp the legions, managing
matters as follows. Bisecting the above line, they start from
this spot and along a line drawn at right angles to the first, they
encamp the cavalry of each legion facing each other and separated by a
distance of fifty podes, the last-mentioned line being exactly half-way
between them. The manner of encamping the cavalry and the
infantry is very similar, the whole space occupied by the maniples and
squadrons being a square. This square faces one of the streets or
viae and is of a fixed length of one hundred podes, and they usually
try to make the depth the same except in the case of the allies.
When they employ the larger legions they add proportionately to
the length and depth.
Polybius Histories 6.29
The cavalry camp is thus something like a street running down from
the middle of the tribunes' tents and at right angles to the line along
which these tents are placed and to the space in front of them, the
whole system of viae being in fact like a number of streets, as either
companies of infantry or troops of horse are encamped facing each other
all along each. Behind the cavalry, then, they place the triarii of
both legions in a similar arrangement, a company next each troop, but
with no space between, and facing in the contrary direction to the
cavalry. They make the depth of each company half its length,
because as a rule the triarii number only half the strength of the
other classes. So that the maniples being often of unequal
strength, the length of the encampments is always the same owing to the
difference in depth. Next at a distance of 50feet on each
side they place the principes facing the triarii, and as they are
turned towards the intervening space, two more streets are formed, both
starting from the same base as that of the cavalry, i.e. the
hundred-podes space in front of the tribunes' tents, and both issuing on
the side of the camp which is opposite to the tribunes' tents and which
we decided to call the front of the whole. After the principes,
and again back to back against them, with no interval they encamp the
hastati. As each class by virtue of the original division
consists of ten maniples, the streets are all equal in length, and they
all break off on the front side of the camp in a straight line, the
last maniples being here so placed as to face to the
front.
Polybius Histories 6.30
At a distance again of 50 podes from the hastati, and facing
them, they encamp the allied cavalry, starting from the same line and
ending on the same line. As I stated above, the number of
the allied infantry is the same as that of the Roman legions, but from
these the extraordinarii must be deducted; while that of the cavalry is
double after deducting the third who serve as extraordinarii. In
forming the camp, therefore, they proportionately increase the depth of
the space assigned to the allied cavalry, in the endeavour to make
their camp equal in length to that of the Romans. These five
streets having been completed, they place the maniples of the allied
infantry, increasing the depth in proportion to their numbers; with
their faces turned away from the cavalry and facing the agger and both
the outer sides of the camp. In each maniple the first tent at
either end is occupied by the centurions. In laying the whole camp out
in this manner they always leave a space of 50 podes between the
fifth troop and the sixth, and similarly with the companies of foot,
so that another passage traversing the whole camp is formed, at
right angles to the streets, and parallel to the line of the tribunes'
tents. This they called quintana, as it runs along the fifth troops and
companies.
Polybius Histories 6.31
The spaces behind the tents of the tribunes to right and left of the
praetorium, are used in the one case for the market and in the other
for the office of the quaestor and the supplies of which he is in
charge. Behind the last tent of the tribunes on either side, and
more or less at right angles to these tents, are the quarters of the
cavalry picked out from the extraordinarii, and a certain number of
volunteers serving to oblige the consuls. These are all encamped
parallel to the two sides of the agger, and facing in the one case the
quaestors' depot and in the other the market. As a rule these
troops are not only thus encamped near the consuls but on the march and
on other occasions are in constant attendance on the consul and
quaestor. Back to back with them, and looking towards the agger
are the select infantry who perform the same service as the cavalry
just described. Beyond these an empty space is left
a hundred podes broad, parallel to the tents of the tribunes, and
stretching along the whole face of the agger on the other side of the
market, praetorium and quaestorium, and on its further side the
rest of the equites extraordinarii are encamped facing the market,
praetorium and quaestorium. In the middle of this cavalry camp
and exactly opposite the praetorium a passage, 50 podes wide, is
left leading to the rear side of the camp and running at right angles
to the broad passage behind the praetorium. Back to back with
these cavalry and fronting the agger and the rearward face of the whole
camp are placed the rest of the pedites extraordinarii. Finally
the spaces remaining empty to right and left next the agger on each
side of the camp are assigned to foreign troops or to any allies who
chance to come in. The whole camp thus forms a square, and the way in which the
streets are laid out and its general arrangement give it the appearance
of a town. The agger is on all sides at a distance of
200 podes from the tents, and this empty space is of important
service in several respects. To begin with it provides the proper
facilities for marching the troops in and out, seeing that they all
march out into this space by their own streets and thus do not come
into one street in a mass and throw down or hustle each other.
Again it is here that they collect the cattle brought into camp
and all booty taken from the enemy, and keep them safe during the
night. But most important thing of all is that in night attacks
neither fire can reach them nor missiles except a very few, which are
almost harmless owing to the distance and the space in front of the
tents.
Polybius Histories 6.32
Given the numbers of cavalry and infantry, whether 4000 or 5000, in
each legion, and given likewise the depth, length, and number of the
troops and companies, the dimensions of the passages and open spaces
and all other details, anyone who gives his mind to it can calculate
the area and total circumference of the camp. If there ever
happen to be an extra number of allies, either of those originally
forming part of the army or of others who have joined on a special
occasion, accommodation is provided for the latter in the neighbourhood
of the praetorium, the market and quaestorium being reduced to the
minimum size which meets pressing requirements, while for the former,
if the excess is considerable, they add two streets, one at each side
of the encampment of the Roman legions. Whenever the two consuls
with all their four legions are united in one camp, we have only to
imagine two camps like the above placed in juxtaposition back to back,
the junction being formed at the encampments of the extraordinarii
infantry of each camp whom we described as being stationed facing the
rearward agger of the camp. The shape of the camp is now oblong,
its area double what it was and its circumference half as much again.
Whenever both consuls encamp together they adopt this
arrangement; but when the two encamp apart the only difference is that
the market, quaestorium, and praetorium are placed between the two
camps.
Polybius Histories 6.33
After forming the camp the tribunes meet and administer an oath, man
by man, to all in the camp, whether freemen or slaves. Each man
swears to steal nothing from the camp and even if he finds anything to
bring it to the tribunes. They next issue their orders to the
maniples of the hastati and principes of each legion, entrusting to two
maniples the care of the ground in front of the tents of the tribunes;
for this ground is the general resort of the soldiers in the
daytime, and so they see to its being swept and watered with great
care. Three of the remaining eighteen maniples are now assigned
by lot to each tribune, this being the number of maniples of principes
and hastati in each legion, and there being six tribunes. Each of these
maniples in turn attends on the tribune, the services they render him
being such as the following. When they encamp they pitch his tent
for him and level the ground round it; and it is their duty to fence
round any of his baggage that may require protection. They also
supply two guards for him (a guard consists of four men), of which
the one is stationed in front of the tent and the other behind it next
the horses. As each tribune has three maniples at his service,
and there are more than a hundred men in each maniple, not counting the
triarii and velites who are not liable to this service, the task is a
light one, as each maniple has to serve only every third day; and
when the necessary comfort of the tribune is well attended to by this
means, the dignity due to his rank is also amply maintained. The
maniples of triarii are exempt from this attendance on the tribune; but
each maniple supplies a guard every day to the squadron of horse close
behind it. This guard, besides keeping a general look out,
watches especially over the horses to prevent them from getting
entangled in their tethers and suffering injuries that would
incapacitate them, or from getting loose and causing confusion and
disturbance in the camp by running against other horses. Finally
each maniple in its turn mounts guard round the consul's tent to
protect him from plots and at the same time to add splendour to the
dignity of his office.
Polybius Histories 6.34
As regards the â€Â¢entrenchment and stockading of the camp, the task
falls upon the allies concerning those two sides along which their two
wings are quartered, the other two sides being assigned to the Romans,
one to each legion. Each side having been divided into sections,
one for each maniple, the centurions stand by and superintend the
details, while two of the tribunes exercise a general supervision over
the work on each side; and it is these latter officers who
superintend all other work connected with the camp. They divide
themselves into pairs, and each pair is on duty in turn for two months
out of six, supervising all field operations. The prefects of the
allies divide their duties on the same system. Every day at dawn
the cavalry officers and centurions attend at the tents of the
tribunes, and the tribunes proceed to that of the consul. He
gives the necessary orders to the tribunes, and they pass them on to
the cavalry officers and centurions, who convey them to the soldiers
when the proper time comes. The way in which they secure the
passing round of the watchword for the night is as follows: from
the tenth maniple of each class of infantry and cavalry, the maniple
which is encamped at the lower end of the street, a man is chosen who
is relieved from guard duty, and he attends every day at sunset at the
tent of the tribune, and receiving from him the watchword — that is a
wooden tablet with the word inscribed on it — takes his leave, and on
returning to his quarters passes on the watchword and tablet before
witnesses to the commander of the next maniple, who in turn passes it
to the one next him. All do the same until it reaches the first
maniples, those encamped near the tents of the tribunes. These latter
are obliged to deliver the tablet to the tribunes before dark. So
that if all those issued are returned, the tribune knows that the
watchword has been given to all the maniples, and has passed through
all on its way back to him. If any one of them is missing, he
makes inquiry at once, as he knows by the marks from what quarter the
tablet has not returned, and whoever is responsible for the stoppage
meets with the punishment he merits.
Polybius Histories 6.35
They manage the night guards thus: The maniple on duty there
guards the consul and his tent, while the tents of the tribunes and the
troops of horse are guarded by the men appointed from each maniple in
the manner I explained above. Each separate body likewise
appoints a guard of its own men for itself. The remaining guards
are appointed by the Consul; and there are generally three pickets at
the quaestorium and two at the tents of each of the legates and members
of the council. The whole outer face of the camp is guard by the
velites, who are posted every day along the vallum this being the
special duty assigned to them and ten of them are on guard at each
entrance. Of those appointed to picket duty, the man in each
maniple who is to take the first watch is brought to the tribune in the
evening by one of the optiones of his company. The tribune gives
them all little tablets, one for each station, quite small, with a sign
written on them and on receiving this they leave for the posts assigned
to them. The duty of going the rounds is entrusted to the
cavalry. The first praefect of cavalry in each legion must give orders
early in the morning to one of his optiones to send notice before
breakfast to four lads of his own squadron who will be required to go
the rounds. The same man must also give notice in the evening to
the praefect of the next squadron that he must make arrangements for
going the rounds on the following day. This praefect, on
receiving the notice, must take precisely the same steps on the next
day; and so on through all the squadrons. The four men chosen by
the optiones from the first squadron, after drawing lots for their
respective watches, go to the tribune and get written orders from him
stating what stations they are to visit and at what time. After
that all four of them go and station themselves next the first maniple
of the triarii, for it is the duty of the centurion of this maniple to
have a bugle sounded at the beginning of each watch.
Polybius Histories 6.36
When this time comes, the man to whom the first watch fell by lot
makes his rounds accompanied by some friends as witnesses. He
visits the posts mentioned in his orders, not only those near the
vallum and the gates, but the pickets also of the infantry maniples and
cavalry squadrons. If he finds the guards of the first watch
awake he receives their tessera, but if he finds that anyone is asleep
or has left his post, he calls those with him to witness the fact, and
proceeds on his rounds. Those who go the rounds in the succeeding
watches act in a similar manner. As I said, the charge of
sounding a bugle at the beginning of each watch, so that those going
the rounds may visit the different stations at the right time, falls on
the centurions of the first maniple of the triarii in each legion, who
take it by turns for a day. Each of the men who have gone the
rounds brings back the tesserae at daybreak to the tribune. If they
deliver them all they are suffered to depart without question;
but if one of them delivers fewer than the number of stations
visited, they find out from examining the signs on the tesserae which
station is missing, and on ascertaining this the tribune calls
the centurion of the maniple and he brings before him the men who were
on picket duty, and they are confronted with the patrol. If the
fault is that of the picket, the patrol makes matters clear at once by
calling the men who had accompanied him, for he is bound to do this;
but if nothing of the kind has happened, the fault rests on him.
Polybius Histories 6.37
A court-martial composed of all the tribunes at once meets to
try him, and if he is found guilty he is punished by the bastinado (
fustuarium). This is inflicted as follows: The tribune takes a
cudgel and just touches the condemned man with it, after which
all in the camp beat or stone him, in most cases dispatching him in the
camp itself. But even those who manage to escape are not saved
thereby: impossible! for they are not allowed to return to their homes,
and none of the family would dare to receive such a man in his house.
So that those who have of course fallen into this misfortune are
utterly ruined. The same punishment is inflicted on the optio and
on the praefect of the squadron, if they do not give the proper orders
at the right time to the patrols and the praefect of the next squadron.
Thus, owing to the extreme severity and inevitableness of the
penalty, the night watches of the Roman army are most scrupulously
kept. While the soldiers are subject to the tribune, the latter
are subject to the consuls. A tribune, and in the case of
the allies a praefect, has the right of inflicting fines, of demanding
sureties, and of punishing by flogging. The bastinado is also
inflicted on those who steal anything from the camp; on those who give
false evidence; on young men who have abused their persons; and finally
on anyone who has been punished thrice for the same fault. Those
are the offences which are punished as crimes, the following being
treated as unmanly acts and disgraceful in a soldier when a man
boasts falsely to the tribune of his valour in the field in order to
gain distinction; when any men who have been placed in a covering
force leave the station assigned to them from fear; likewise when
anyone throws away from fear any of his arms in the actual battle.
Therefore the men in covering forces often face certain death,
refusing to leave their ranks even when vastly outnumbered, owing to
dread of the punishment they would meet with; and again in the
battle men who have lost a shield or sword or any other arm often throw
themselves into the midst of the enemy, hoping either to recover the
lost object or to escape by death from inevitable disgrace and the
taunts of their relations.
Polybius Histories 6.38
If the same thing ever happens to large bodies, and if entire
maniples desert their posts when exceedingly hard pressed, the officers
refrain from inflicting the bastinado or the death penalty on all, but
find a solution of the difficulty which is both salutary and
terror-striking. The tribune assembles the legion, and brings up
those guilty of leaving the ranks, reproaches them sharply, and finally
chooses by lots sometimes five, sometimes eight, sometimes twenty of
the offenders, so adjusting the number thus chosen that they form as
near as possible the tenth part of those guilty of cowardice.
Those on whom the lot falls are bastinadoed mercilessly in the
manner above described; the rest receive rations of barley instead of
wheat and are ordered to encamp outside the camp on an unprotected
spot. As therefore the danger and dread of drawing the fatal lot
affects all equally, as it is uncertain on whom it will fall; and as
the public disgrace of receiving barley rations falls on all alike,
this practice is that best calculated both the inspire fear and to
correct the mischief.
Polybius Histories 6.39
They also have an admirable method of encouraging the young soldiers
to face danger. After a battle in which some of them have
distinguished themselves, the general calls an assembly of the troops,
and bringing forward those whom he considers to have displayed
conspicuous valour, first of all speaks in laudatory terms of the
courageous deeds of each and of anything else in their previous conduct
which deserves commendation, and afterwards distributes the following
rewards. To the man who has wounded an enemy, a spear; to him who
has slain and stripped an enemy, a cup if he be in the infantry and
horse trappings if in the cavalry, although the gift here was
originally only a spear. These gifts are not made to men who have
wounded or stripped an enemy in a regular battle or at the storming of
a city, but to those who during skirmishes or in similar circumstances,
where there is no necessity for engaging in single combat, have
voluntarily and deliberately thrown themselves into the danger.
To the first man to mount the wall at the assault on a city, he
gives a crown of gold. So also those who have shielded and saved
any of the citizens or allies receive honorary gifts from the consul,
and the men they saved crown their preservers, if not under their own
free will under compulsion from the tribunes who judge the case.
The man thus preserved also reverences his preserver as a father
all through his life, and must treat him in every way like a parent.
By such incentives they excite to emulation and rivalry in the
field not only the men who are present and listen to their words, but
those who remain at home also. For the recipients of such gifts,
quite apart from becoming famous in the army and famous too for the
time at their homes, are especially distinguished in religious
processions after their return, as no one is allowed to wear
decorations except those on whom these honours for bravery have been
conferred by the consul; 0 and in their houses they hand up the
spoils they won in the most conspicuous places, looking upon them as
tokens and evidences of their valour. Considering all this
attention given to the matter of punishments and rewards in the army
and the importance attached to both, no wonder that the wars in which
the Romans engage end so successfully and brilliantly. As pay the
foot-soldier receives two obols a day, a centurion twice as much, and a
cavalry-soldier a drachma. The allowance of corn to a
foot-soldier is about two-thirds of an Attic medimnus a month, a
cavalry-soldier receives seven medimni of barley and two of wheat.
Of the allies the infantry receive the same, the cavalry one and
one-third medimnus of wheat and five of barley, these rations being a
free gift to the allies; but in the case of the Romans the quaestor
deducts from their pay the price fixed for their corn and clothes and
any additional arm they require.
Polybius Histories 6.40
The following is their manner of breaking up camp. Immediately
upon the signal being given they take down the tents and every one
packs up. No tent, however, may be either taken down or set up before
those of the tribunes and consul. On the second signal they load
the pack animals, and on the third the leaders of the column must
advance and set the whole camp in movement. They usually place
the extraordinarii at the head of the column. Next comes the right wing
of the allies and behind them their pack animals. The first Roman
legion marches next with its baggage behind it and it is followed by
the second legion, which has behind it both its own pack animals
and also the baggage of the allies who bring up the rear; for the left
wing of the allies forms the extreme rear of the column on the march.
The cavalry sometimes marches in the rear of the respective
bodies to which it belongs and sometimes on the flanks of the pack
train, keeping the animals together and affording them protection.
When an attack is expected from the rear, the same order is
maintained, but the allied extraordinarii, not any other portion of the
allies, march in the rear instead of the van. Of the two legions
and wings each takes the front or rear position on alternate days, so
that by this change of order all may equally share the advantage of a
fresh water supply and fresh foraging ground. They have also
another kind of marching order at times of danger when they have open
ground enough. For in this case the hastati, principes, and
triarii form three parallel columns, the pack trains of the leading
maniples being placed in front of all, those of the second maniples
behind the leading maniples, those of the third behind the second and
so on, with the baggage trains always interspersed between the bodies
of troops. With this order of march when the column is
threatened, they face now to the left now to the right, and getting
clear of the baggage confront the enemy from whatever side he appears.
So that very rapidly, and by one movement the infantry is placed
in order of battle (except perhaps that the hastati may have to wheel
round the others), and the crowd of baggage animals and their
attendants are in their proper place in the battle, being covered by
the line of troops.
Polybius Histories 6.41
When the army on the march is near the place of encampment, one of
the tribunes and those centurions who are specially charged with this
duty go out in advance, and after surveying the whole ground on
which the camp is to be formed, first of all determine from the
considerations I mentioned above where the consul's tent should be
placed and on which front of the space round this tent the legions
should encamp. When they have decided on this, they measure out
first the area of the praetorium, next the straight line along which
the tents of the tribunes are erected and next the line parallel to
this, starting from which the troops form their encampment. In
the same way they draw lines on the other side of the praetorium, the
arrangement of which I described above in detail and at some
length. All this is done in a very short time, as the marking out
is a quite easy matter, all the distances being fixed and familiar;
and they now plant flags, one on the spot intended for the
consul's tent, another on that side of it they have chosen for the
camp, a third in the middle of the line on which the tribune's tents
will stand, and a fourth on the other parallel line along which the
legions will encamp. These latter flags are crimson, but the
consul's is white. On the ground on the other side of the praetorium
they plant either simple spears or flags of other colours. After
this they go on to lay out the streets and plant spears in each street.
Consequently it is obvious that when the legions march up and get
a good view of the site for the camp, all the parts of it are known at
once to everyone, as they have only to reckon from the position of the
consul's flag. So that, as everyone knows exactly in which street
and in what part of the street his tent will be, since all invariably
occupy the same place in the camp, the encamping somewhat resembles the
return of an army to its native city. For then they break up at
the gate and everyone goes straight on from there and reaches his own
house without fail, as he knows both the quarter and the exact spot
where his residence is situated. It is very much the same thing
in a Roman camp.
Polybius Histories 6.42
The Romans by thus studying convenience in this matter pursue, it
seems to me, a course diametrically opposite to that usual among the
Greeks. The Greeks in encamping think it of primary importance to
adapt the camp to the natural advantages of the ground, first because
they shirk the labour of entrenching, and next because they think
artificial defences are not equal in value to the fortifications which
nature provides unaided on the spot. So that as regards the plan
of the camp as a whole they are obliged to adopt all kinds of shapes to
suit the nature of the ground, and they often have to shift the parts
of the army to unsuitable situations, the consequence being that
everyone is quite uncertain whereabouts in the camp his own place or
the place of his corps is. The Romans on the contrary prefer to
submit to the fatigue of entrenching and other defensive work for the
sake of the convenience of having a single type of camp which never
varies and is familiar to all. Such are the most important facts
about the Roman armies and especially about the method of
encampment. . . .
VII. The Roman Republic compared with othersPolybius Histories 6.43
One may say that nearly all authors have handed down to us the
reputation for excellence enjoyed by the constitutions of Sparta,
Crete, Mantinea, and Carthage. Some make mention also of those of
Athens and Thebes. I leave these last two aside; for
I am myself convinced that the constitutions of Athens and Thebes
need not be dealt with at length, considering that these states neither
grew by a normal process, nor did they remain for long in their most
flourishing state, nor were the changes they underwent immaterial;
but after a sudden effulgence so to speak, the work of chance and
circumstance, while still apparently prosperous and with every prospect
of a bright future, they experienced a complete reverse of fortune.
For the Thebans, striking at the Lacedaemonians through their
mistaken policy and the hatred their allies bore them, owing to the
admirable qualities of one or at most two men, who had detected these
weaknesses, gained in Greece a reputation for superiority.
Indeed, that the successes of the Thebans at that time were due
not to the form of their constitution, but to the high qualities of
their leading men, was made manifest to all by Fortune immediately
afterwards. For the success of Thebes grew, attained its height,
and ceased with the lives of Epaminondas and Pelopidas; and
therefore we must regard the temporary splendour of that state as due
not to its constitution, but to its men.
Polybius Histories 6.44
We must hold very much the same opinion about the Athenian
constitution. For Athens also, though she perhaps enjoyed more
frequent periods of success, after her most glorious one of all which
was coeval with the excellent administration of Themistocles, rapidly
experienced a complete reverse of fortune owing to the inconstancy of
her nature. For the Athenian populace always more or less
resembles a ship without a commander. In such a ship when fear of
the billows or the danger of a storm induces the mariners to be
sensible and attend to the orders of the skipper, they do their duty
admirably. But when they grow over-confident and begin to
entertain contempt for their superiors and to quarrel with each other,
as they are no longer all of the same way of thinking, then with some
of them determined to continue the voyage, and others putting pressure
on the skipper to anchor, with some letting out the sheets and others
preventing them and ordering the sails to be taken it, not only does
the spectacle strike anyone who watches it as disgraceful owing to
their disagreement and contention, but the position of affairs is a
source of actual danger to the rest of those on board; so that
often after escaping from the perils of the widest seas and fiercest
storms they are shipwrecked in harbour and when close to the shore.
This is what has more than once befallen the Athenian state.
After having averted the greatest and most terrible dangers owing to
the high qualities of the people and their leaders, it has come to
grief at times by sheer heedlessness and unreasonableness in seasons of
unclouded tranquillity. Therefore I need say no more about
this constitution or that of Thebes, states in which everything is
managed by the uncurbed impulse of a mob in the one case exceptionally
headstrong and ill-tempered and in the other brought up in an
atmosphere of violence and passion.
Polybius Histories 6.45
To pass to the constitution of Crete, two points here demand our
attention. How was it that the most learned of the ancient writers
Ephorus, Xenophon, Callisthenes, and Plato state in the first place
that it is one and the same with that of Lacedaemon and in the second
place pronounce it worthy of commendation? In my own opinion
neither of these assertions is true. Whether or not I am
right the following observations will show. And first as to its
dissimilarity with the constitution of Sparta. The peculiar features of
the Spartan state are said to be first the land laws by which no
citizen may own more than another, but all must possess an equal share
of the public land; secondly their view of money-making; for,
money being esteemed of no value at all among them, the jealous
contention due to the possession of more or less is utterly done away
with; and thirdly the fact that of the magistrates by whom or by
whose co-operation the whole administration is conducted, the kings
hold a hereditary office and the members of the Gerousia are elected
for life.
Polybius Histories 6.46
In all these respects the Cretan practice is exactly the opposite.
Their laws go as far as possible in letting them acquire land to
the extent of their power, as the saying is, and money is held in such
high honour among them that its acquisition is not only regarded as
necessary, but as most honourable. So much in fact do sordid love
of gain and lust for wealth prevail among them, that the Cretans are
the only people in the world in whose eyes no gain is disgraceful.
Again their magistracies are annual and elected on a democratic
system. So that it often causes surprise how these authors
proclaim to us, that two political systems the nature of which is so
opposed, are allied and akin to each other. Besides overlooking
such differences, these writers go out of their way to give us their
general views, saying that Lycurgus was the only man who ever saw the
points of vital importance for good government. For, there being
two things to which a state owes its preservation, bravery against the
enemy and concord among the citizens, Lycurgus by doing away with the
lust for wealth did away also with all civil discord and broils.
In consequence of which the Lacedaemonians, being free from these
evils, excel all the Greeks in the conduct of their internal affairs
and in their spirit of union. After asserting this, although they
witness that the Cretans, on the other hand, owing to their ingrained
lust of wealth are involved in constant broils both public and private,
and in murders and civil wars, they regard this as immaterial, and have
the audacity to say that the two political systems are similar.
Ephorus actually, apart from the names, uses the same phrases in
explaining the nature of the two states; so that if one did not attend
to the proper names it would be impossible to tell of which he is
speaking. Such are the points in which I consider these two
political systems to differ, and I will now give my reasons for
not regarding that of Crete as worthy of praise or imitation.
Polybius Histories 6.47
In my opinion there are two fundamental things in every state, by
virtue of which its principle and constitution is either desirable or
the reverse. I mean customs and laws. What is desirable in
these makes men's private lives righteous and well ordered and the
general character of the state gentle and just, while what is to be
avoided has the opposite effect. So just as when we observe the
laws and customs of a people to be good, we have no hesitation in
pronouncing that the citizens and the state will consequently be good
also, thus when we notice that men are covetous in their private lives
and that their public actions are unjust, we are plainly justified in
saying that their laws, their particular customs, and the state as a
whole are bad. Now it would be impossible to find except in some
rare instances personal conduct more treacherous or a public policy
more unjust than in Crete. Holding then the Cretan constitution
to be neither similar to that of Sparta nor in any way deserving of
praise and imitation, I dismiss it from the comparison which
I have proposed to make. Nor again is it fair to introduce
Plato's republic which also is much belauded by some philosophers.
For just as we do not admit to athletic contests artists or
athletes who are not duly entered and have not been in training, so we
have no right to admit this constitution to the competition for the
prize of merit, unless it first give an exhibition of its actual
working. Up to the present it would be just the same thing to
discuss it with a view to comparison with the constitutions of Sparta,
Rome, and Carthage, as to take some statue and compare it with living
and breathing men. For even if the workmanship of the statue were
altogether praiseworthy, the comparison of a lifeless thing with a
living being would strike spectators as entirely imperfect and
incongruous.
Polybius Histories 6.48
Dismissing, therefore, these constitutions, we will return to that
of Sparta. To me it seems as far as regards the maintenance of
concord among the citizens, the security of the Laconian territory and
the preservation of the freedom of Sparta, the legislation of Lycurgus
and the foresight he exhibited were so admirable that one is forced to
regard his institutions as of divine rather than human origin.
For the equal division of landed property and the simple and
common diet were calculated to produce temperance in the private lives
of the citizens and to secure the commonwealth as a whole from civil
strife, as was the training in the endurance of hardships and dangers
to form brave and valorous men. Now when both these virtues,
fortitude and temperance, are combined in one soul or in one city, evil
will not readily originate within such men or such peoples, nor will
they be easily overmastered by their neighbours. By constructing,
therefore, his constitution in this manner and out of these elements,
Lycurgus secured the absolute safety of the whole territory of Laconia,
and left to the Spartans themselves a lasting heritage of freedom.
But as regards the annexation of neighbouring territories,
supremacy in Greece, and, generally speaking, an ambitious policy, he
seems to me to have made absolutely no provision for such
contingencies, either in particular enactments or in the general
constitution of the state. What he left undone, therefore, was to
bring to bear on the citizens some force or principle, by which, just
as he had made them simple and contented in their private lives, he
might make the spirit of the city as a whole likewise contented and
moderate. But now, while he made them most unambitious and
sensible people as regards their private lives and the institutions of
their city, he left them most ambitious, domineering, and aggressive
towards the rest of the Greeks.
Polybius Histories 6.49
For who is not aware that they were almost the first of the Greeks
to cast longing eyes on the territory of their neighbours, making war
on the Messenians out of covetousness and for the purpose of enslaving
them? And is it not narrated by all historians how out of sheer
obstinacy they bound themselves by an oath not to desist from the siege
before they had taken Messene? It is no less universally known
that owing to their desire of domination in Greece they were obliged to
execute the behests of the very people they had conquered in battle.
For they conquered the Persians when they invaded Greece,
fighting for her freedom; but when the invaders had withdrawn and
fled they betrayed the Greek cities to them by the peace of Antalcidas,
in order to procure money for establishing their sovereignty over the
Greeks; and here a conspicuous defect in their constitution
revealed itself. For as long as they aspired to rule over their
neighbours or over the Peloponnesians alone, they found the supplies
and resources furnished by Laconia itself adequate, as they had all
they required ready to hand, and quickly returned home whether by land
or sea. But once they began to undertake naval expeditions and to
make military campaigns outside the Peloponnese, it was evident that
neither their iron currency nor the exchange of their crops for
commodities which they lacked, as permitted by the legislation of
Lycurgus, would suffice for their needs, since these enterprises
demanded a currency in universal circulation and supplies drawn from
abroad; and so they were compelled to be beggars from the
Persians, to impose tribute on the islanders, and exact contributions
from all the Greeks, as they recognized that under the legislation of
Lycurgus it was impossible to aspire, I will not say to supremacy
in Greece, but to any position of influence.
Polybius Histories 6.50
But what is the purpose of this digression? It is to show from the
actual evidence of facts, that for the purpose of remaining in secure
possession of their own territory and maintaining their freedom the
legislation of Lycurgus is amply sufficient, and to those who
maintain this to be the object of political constitutions we must admit
that there is not and never was any system or constitution superior to
that of Lycurgus. But if anyone is ambitious of greater things,
and esteems it finer and more glorious than that to be the leader of
many men and to rule and lord it over many and have the eyes of all the
world turned to him, it must be admitted that from this point of
view the Laconian constitution is defective, while that of Rome is
superior and better framed for the attainment of power, as is
indeed evident from the actual course of events. For when the
Lacedaemonians endeavoured to obtain supremacy in Greece, they very
soon ran the risk of losing their own liberty; whereas the
Romans, who had aimed merely at the subjection of Italy, in a short
time brought the whole world under their sway, the abundant of supplies
they had at their command conducing in no small measure to this
result.
Polybius Histories 6.51
The constitution of Carthage seems to me to have been originally
well contrived as regards its most distinctive points. For there
were kings, and the house of Elders was an aristocratical force, and
the people were supreme in matters proper to them, the entire frame of
the state much resembling that of Rome and Sparta. But at the
time when they entered on the Hannibalic War, the Carthaginian
constitution had degenerated, and that of Rome was better. For as
every body or state or action has its natural periods first of growth,
then of prime, and finally of decay, and as everything in them is at
its best when they are in their prime, it was for this reason that the
difference between the two states manifested itself at this time.
For by as much as the power and prosperity of Carthage had been
earlier than that of Rome, by so much had Carthage already begun to
decline; while Rome was exactly at her prime, as far as at least as her
system of government was concerned. Consequently the multitude at
Carthage had already acquired the chief voice in deliberations; while
at Rome the senate still retained this; and hence, as in one case
the masses deliberated and in the other the most eminent men, the Roman
decisions on public affairs were superior, so that although they
met with complete disaster, they were finally by the wisdom of their
counsels victorious over the Carthaginians in the
war.
Polybius Histories 6.52
But to pass to differences of detail, such as, to begin with, the
conduct of war, the Carthaginians naturally are superior at sea both in
efficiency and equipment, because seamanship has long been their
national craft, and they busy themselves with the sea more than any
other people; but as regards military service on land the Romans
are much more efficient. They indeed devote their whole energies
to this matter, whereas the Carthaginians entirely neglect their
infantry, though they do pay some slight attention to their cavalry.
The reason of this is that the troops they employ are foreign and
mercenary, whereas those of the Romans are natives of the soil and
citizens. So that in this respect also we must pronounce the
political system of Rome to be superior to that of Carthage, the
Carthaginians continuing to depend for the maintenance of their freedom
on the courage of a mercenary force but the Romans on their own valour
and on the aid of their allies. Consequently even if they happen
to be worsted at the outset, the Romans redeem defeat by final success,
while it is the contrary with the Carthaginians. For the Romans,
fighting as they are for their country and their children, never can
abate their fury but continue to throw their whole hearts into the
struggle until they get the better of their enemies. It follows
that though the Romans are, as I said, much less skilled in naval
matters, they are on the whole successful at sea owing to the gallantry
of their men; for although skill in seamanship is of no small
importance in naval battles, it is chiefly the courage of the marines
that turns the scale in favour of victory. Now not only do
Italians in general naturally excel Phoenicians and Africans in bodily
strength and personal courage, but by their institutions also they do
much to foster a spirit of bravery in the young men.
A single instance will suffice to indicate the pains taken
by the state to turn out men who will be ready to endure everything in
order to gain a reputation in their country for
valour.
Polybius Histories 6.53
Whenever any illustrious man dies, he is carried at his funeral into
the forum to the so‑called rostra, sometimes conspicuous in an upright
posture and more rarely reclined. Here with all the people
standing round, a grown-up son, if he has left one who happens to be
present, or if not some other relative mounts the rostra and discourses
on the virtues and successful achievements of the dead. As a
consequence the multitude and not only those who had a part in these
achievements, but those also who had none, when the facts are recalled
to their minds and brought before their eyes, are moved to such
sympathy that the loss seems to be not confined to the mourners, but a
public one affecting the whole people. Next after the interment
and the performance of the usual ceremonies, they place the image of
the departed in the most conspicuous position in the house, enclosed in
a wooden shrine. This image is a mask reproducing with remarkable
fidelity both the features and complexion of the deceased. On the
occasion of public sacrifices they display these images, and decorate
them with much care, and when any distinguished member of the family
dies they take them to the funeral, putting them on men who seem to
them to bear the closest resemblance to the original in stature and
carriage. These representatives wear togas, with a purple border
if the deceased was a consul or praetor, whole purple if he was a
censor, and embroidered with gold if he had celebrated a triumph or
achieved anything similar. They all ride in chariots preceded by
the fasces, axes, and other insignia by which the different magistrates
are wont to be accompanied according to the respective dignity of the
offices of state held by each during his life; and when they
arrive at the rostra they all seat themselves in a row on ivory chairs.
There could not easily be a more ennobling spectacle for a young man
who aspires to fame and virtue. For who would not be inspired by
the sight of the images of men renowned for their excellence, all
together and as if alive and breathing? What spectacle could be more
glorious than this?
Polybius Histories 6.54
Besides, he who makes the oration over the man about to be buried,
when he has finished speaking of him recounts the successes and
exploits of the rest whose images are present, beginning with the most
ancient. By this means, by this constant renewal of the good
report of brave men, the celebrity of those who performed noble deeds
is rendered immortal, while at the same time the fame of those who did
good service to their country becomes known to the people and a
heritage for future generations. But the most important result is
that young men are thus inspired to endure every suffering for public
welfare in the hope of winning the glory that attends on brave men.
What I say is confirmed by the facts. For many Romans have
voluntarily engaged in single combat in order to decide a battle, not a
few have faced certain death, some in war to save the lives of the
rest, and others in peace to save the republic. Some even when in
office have put their own sons to death contrary to every law or
custom, setting a higher value on the interest of their country than on
the ties of nature that bound them to their nearest and dearest.
Many such stories about many men are related in Roman history,
but one told of a certain person will suffice for the present as an
example and as a confirmation of what I say.
Polybius Histories 6.55
It is narrated that when Horatius Cocles was engaged in combat with
two of the enemy at the far end of the bridge over the Tiber that lies
in the front of the town, he saw large reinforcements coming up to help
the enemy, and fearing lest they should force the passage and get into
town, he turned round and called to those behind him to retire and cut
the bridge with all speed. His order was obeyed, and while they
were cutting the bridge, he stood to his ground receiving many wounds,
and arrested the attack of the enemy who were less astonished at his
physical strength than at his endurance and courage. The bridge
once cut, the enemy were prevented from attacking; and Cocles, plunging
into the river in full armour as he was, deliberately sacrificed his
life regarding the safety of his country and the glory which in future
would attach to his name as of more importance than his present
existence and the years of life which remained to him. Such, if
I am not wrong, is the eager emulation of achieving noble deeds
engendered in the Roman youth by their institutions.
Polybius Histories 6.56
Again, the laws and customs relating to the acquisition of wealth
are better in Rome than at Carthage. At Carthage nothing which
results in profit is regarded as disgraceful; at Rome nothing is
considered more so than to accept bribes and seek gain from improper
channels. For no less strong than their approval of money-making
is their condemnation of unscrupulous gain from forbidden sources.
A proof of this is that at Carthage candidates for office
practise open bribery, whereas at Rome death is the penalty for it.
Therefore as the rewards offered to merit are the opposite in the
two cases, it is natural that the steps taken to gain them should also
be dissimilar. But the quality in which the Roman commonwealth is
most distinctly superior is in my opinion the nature of their religious
convictions. I believe that it is the very thing which among
other peoples is an object of reproach, I mean superstition, which
maintains the cohesion of the Roman State. These matters are
clothed in such pomp and introduced to such an extent into their public
and private life that nothing could exceed it, a fact which will
surprise many. My own opinion at least is that they have adopted
this course for the sake of the common people. It is a course
which perhaps would not have been necessary had it been possible to
form a state composed of wise men, but as every multitude is
fickle, full of lawless desires, unreasoned passion, and violent anger,
the multitude must be held in by invisible terrors and suchlike
pageantry. For this reason I think, not that the ancients
acted rashly and at haphazard in introducing among the people notions
concerning the gods and beliefs in the terrors of hell, but that the
moderns are most rash and foolish in banishing such beliefs. The
consequence is that among the Greeks, apart from other things, members
of the government, if they are entrusted with no more than a talent,
though they have ten copyists and as many seals and twice as many
witnesses, cannot keep their faith; whereas among the Romans
those who as magistrates and legates are dealing with large sums of
money maintain correct conduct just because they have pledged their
faith by oath. Whereas elsewhere it is a rare thing to find a man
who keeps his hands off public money, and whose record is clean in this
respect, among the Romans one rarely comes across a man who has been
detected in such conduct. . . .
Polybius Histories 6.57
That all existing things are subject to decay and change is a truth
that scarcely needs proof; for the course of nature is sufficient to
force this conviction on us. There being two agencies by which
every kind of state is liable to decay, the one external and the other
a growth of the state itself, we can lay down no fixed rule about the
former, but the latter is a regular process. I have already
stated what kind of state is the first to come into being, and what the
next, and how the one is transformed into the other; so that those who
are capable of connecting the opening propositions of this inquiry with
its conclusion will now be able to foretell the future unaided. And
what will happen is, I think, evident. When a state has
weathered many great perils and subsequently attains to supremacy and
uncontested sovereignty, it is evident that under the influence of long
established prosperity, life will become more extravagant and the
citizens more fierce in their rivalry regarding office and other
objects than they ought to be. As these defects go on increasing,
the beginning of the change for the worse will be due to love of office
and the disgrace entailed by obscurity, as well as to extravagance and
purse-proud display; and for this change the populace will be
responsible when on the one hand they think they have a grievance
against certain people who have shown themselves grasping, and when, on
the other hand, they are puffed up by the flattery of others who aspire
to office. For now, stirred to fury and swayed by passion in all
their counsels, they will no longer consent to obey or even to be the
equals of the ruling caste, but will demand the lion's share for
themselves. When this happens, the state will change its name to
the finest sounding of all, freedom and democracy, but will change its
nature to the worst thing of all, mob-rule. Having dealt with the
origin and growth of the Roman republic, and with its prime and its
present condition, and also with the differences for better or worse
between it and others, I may now close this discourse more or less
so.
Polybius Histories 6.58
But, drawing now upon the period immediately subsequent to the date
at which I abandoned my narrative to enter on this digression,
I will make brief and summary mention of one occurrence; so that,
as if exhibiting a single specimen of a good artist's work, I may
make manifest not by words only but by actual fact the perfection and
strength of principle of the Republic such as it then was.
Hannibal, when, after his victory over the Romans at Cannae, the
eight thousand who garrisoned the camp fell into his hands, after
making them all prisoners, allowed them to send a deputation to those
at home on the subject of their ransom and release. Upon their
naming ten of their most distinguished members, he sent them off after
making them swear that they would return to him. One of those
nominated just as he was going out of the camp said he had forgotten
something and went back, and after recovering the thing he had left
behind again took his departure, thinking that by his return he had
kept his faith and absolved himself of his oath. Upon their
arrival in Rome they begged and entreated the senate not to grudge the
prisoners their release, but to allow each of them to pay three minae
and return to his people; for Hannibal, they said, had made this
concession. The men deserved to be released, for they had neither
been guilty of cowardice in the battle nor had they done anything
unworthy of Rome; but having been left behind to guard the camp, they
had, when all the rest had perished in the battle, been forced to yield
to circumstances and surrender to the enemy. But the Romans,
though they had met with severe reverses in the war, and had now,
roughly speaking, lost all their allies and were in momentary
expectation of Rome itself being placed in peril, after listening
to this plea, neither disregarded their dignity under the pressure of
calamity, nor neglected to take into consideration every proper step;
but seeing that Hannibal's object in acting thus was both to
obtain funds and to deprive the troops.opposed to him of their high spirit, by showing that, even if defeated,
they might hope for safety, they were so far from acceding to
this request, that they did not allow their pity for their kinsmen, or
the consideration of the service the men would render them, to prevail,
but defeated Hannibal's calculation and the hopes he had based on
them by refusing to ransom the men, and at the same time imposed by law
on their own troops the duty of either conquering or dying in the
field, as there was no hope of safety for them if defeated.
Therefore after coming to this decision they dismissed the nine
delegates who returned of their own free will, as bound by their oath,
while as for the man who had thought to free himself from the oath by a
ruse they put him in irons and returned him to the enemy; so that
Hannibal's joy at his victory in the battle was not so great as his
dejection, when he saw with amazement how steadfast and high-spirited
were the Romans in their deliberations.
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